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This thesis examines the value of the local government's financial
claims on redeveloped real estate. The thesis estimates the value
of claims that the City of Boston would hold on six alternative re-
development schemes proposed for the Park Plaza urban renewal area.
The value of the local government's claim on redevelopment, designated
the Residual Market Value, is the net present value of the cash flows
accruing to the local government as a direct result of redevelopment.
The real estate taxes collected by the city constitute the direct
cash inflows, while the public capital contributions towards creation
of the project constitute the cash outflow.
The thesis first develops a model to determine the value of newly
constructed real estate as the present value of the cash flows of
the investment. The model recognizes that actual redevelopment will
be done by a private firm, determining the cash flow that must be
allocated to the private developer to compensate for risk of the
project. The model then computes the value of the residual cash
flows that can be appropriated by local government without destroying
private feasibility. The model makes reference to modern financial
theory to account for uncertainty in the valuation of future cash
flows.
The thesis then uses data provided by the Boston Redevelopment Authority
to compute the Residual Market Value of public claims on each of the six
redevelopment alternatives. Since the six alternatives cover a range of
redevelopment densities and scales, the computation of the Residual
Market Value for each provides a monetary standard to be compared to
the other public costs and benefits of development.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Boston Redevelopment Authority has proposed six alternative
schemes for the redevelopment of the Park Plaza renewal area. These
schemes would create between two and six million square feet of office,
retail, residential, hotel, and parking space on the ten acre site.
There has been great controversy over the relative weight of the many
costs and benefits that will accrue to the City of Boston and its
citizenry as a result of such a major real estate development.
This thesis attempts to determine the value of the local govern-
ment's financial claims on the redeveloped real estate. The value of
such claims, designated Residual Market Value, is the net present value
of the cash flows accruing to the City of Boston as a direct result of
the redevelopment. The real estate taxes collected by the City con-
stitute the direct cash inflows, while the construction costs of
infrastructure necessary to support the new development and other
public capital contributions to the project constitute the cash
outflows.
This thesis first develops a model to compute the present value
of public claims on redevelopment. This model recognizes that the
actual process of redevelopment will be pursued by a private develop-
ment firm. The model therefore accepts as a constraint that the value
of the cash flows appropriated by the private developer must exceed the
costs that the developer must bear to create the project. Once a
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development meets this private feasibility test, the remainder of
cash flows can be appropriated by the local government through the
use of the property tax. The model starts with competitive market
prices of inputs and outputs of the redevelopment process. It then
determines the present value of the purchase of the inputs and the
sale of the outputs, recognizing the uncertainty of future cash flows.
After allowing adequate cash flow to maintain private feasibility,
the model determines the present value to the local government on
the remainder of the cash flows.
The thesis then uses data provided by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority to compute the Residual Market Value of public claims on
each of the six redevelopment alternatives. Computation of the
Residual Market Value of the six alternatives, each of which re-
presents development at a different scale and density, provides a
measure of the monetary value of redevelopment to be weighed against
the other public costs and benefits.
There are two sets of basic objectives underlying this work.
On one hand, the thesis attempts to work fully through a problem,
dealing with all encountered adversity, and to come up with a useable
answer. That is the practical objective. On the other hand, the
thesis attempts to deal with a number of interesting theoretical
issues that have not received wide coverage in the literature. That
is the more profound objective.
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The practical objective is by far the more exacting because
it requires toleration of inadequacy beyond one's control. In order
to get an answer, no matter how good the model, one needs data. In
this case, the data available from the Boston Redevelopment Authority
left much to be desired, yet it was beyond the scope of this work to
replace that data. The thesis uses that data, but with reservations
noted.
In many respects that data was necessarily limited just because
of the lack of specification of the alternatives at this point in
time. The project has not yet been designed, nor has any developer
agreed that the Boston Redevelopment Authority's data is reasonable.
As a result, the thesis develops a model that specifies the expected
pattern of cash flows in terms of just a few basic input variables.
This model specifying the pattern of cash flows of a real estate
development investment is useful beyond the bounds of this work.
The theoretical issues encountered are those most closely related
to capital budgeting under uncertainty. The thesis first selects a
methodology for the valuation of future uncertain cash flows. While
such techniques have been widely discussed in relation to private
market investment, this thesis applies modern financial theory to
local public finance. Specifically, the thesis applies the Capital
Asset Pricing Model to local governmental entities to determine the
appropriate "social cost of capital" to be used in valuing uncertain
cash flows.
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The first section of the work reviews the context of public
decision affecting redevelopment at Park Plaza. The next section,
comprised of Chapters 3 to 7, develops the model to compute Residual
Market Value. Chapter 3 presents a preliminary definition of Residual
Market Value. Chapter 4 first develops a model of the pattern of in-
vestment cash flows, based on twelve basic variables. The model is
then extended to provide the present value of each component of the
cash flow as a function of the relevant market prices and the ap-
propriate cost of capital. Chapter 5 presents the financial theory
assumptions underlying the selection of the structure of discount
rates to be used. It is in this Chapter that the methodology for
dealing with uncertainty is presented. Chapter 6 presents the model
for determining the value of tax revenues from the parcels that are
not redeveloped. Chapter 7 summarizes the model for computing Residual
Market Value.
The third section of the work presents the data to be used in
the model. The three chapters in this section present the architec-
tural, financial, and taxation program data.
The last section presents the computation of Residual Market
Value, checks the sensitivity of the model to key data, and presents
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
PARK PLAZA: THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC DECISION
2.1 The Situation
For nearly five years, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the
State Department of Community Affairs, the Boston Urban Associates (Mort
Zuckerman's development firm), the Park Plaza Civic Advisory Council,
consultants, architects and politicians, have been trying to decide what
ought to happen to a piece of land in downtown Boston. This 10 acre site
is known as Park Plaza. The area was originally identified for urban
renewal in 1970, when the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) announced
that it would accept proposals from private developers to redevelop the
site. From five competing proposals, the BRA selected Boston Urban
Associates' (BUA), which had proposed a 266 million dollar (1970 prices)
scheme to build over five million square feet of office, retail, residen-
tial, hotel, entertainment, and public open space. The project was viewed
by the BRA as an integral part of the Boston high-spine development
concept: an effort to redevelop continuously a strip of land running
from the Prudential Center on the west to the downtown financial district
on the east with high-rise mixed use buildings. As the downtown area map
indicates, Park Plaza would be the central link in the scheme, enjoying
full frontage on the Boston Garden and Common.
Park Plaza rapidly became Boston's most publicized redevelopment
project. It was outstanding in several respects. The mixture of building
uses and the total size of the project, along with total integration of
design and development made the project spectacular. Politically, the
project was unprecedented because it did not require any federal urban
-9-
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renewal subsidies to write down the cost of the land. Park Plaza was to
be the first example of "private urban renewal" in Boston. As the
developer described the project, "[It] represents the most dramatic
design in the whole country in the last 34 years. The only comparable
project is Rockefeller Center, which was [also] done with private
capital."'
But while the developer did not require any federal subsidies to
reduce the land cost, he did require the use of the BRA's power of
eminent domain to help him acquire the large number of small parcels
within the project area with reasonable speed, and to protect him from
holdouts who could otherwise extract inflated prices for the last parcels
necessary to complete assembly of the site. The BRA was authorized to
utilize its eminent domain powers on behalf of a private renewal de-
veloper by state law, which limited such use to projects that involved
the renewal of "blighted" areas. The law also required the BRA to get
approval of the urban renewal plan from the State Department of Community
Affairs (DCA).2 The history of that approval process merits a compre-
hensive study itself. The process has been on-going for nearly five
years, and has touched on almost every economic, political, social,
environmental, legal, and moral issue conceivably relevant to urban
redevelopment. The process cost one Commissioner of Community Affairs
his job, brought the Mayor of Boston and the Governor of Massachusetts
to political confrontation, discouraged the developer to the point where
he no longer participates in the process, and has delayed the project
so substantially that it may not make sense any more.3
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Throughout the entire process, the most fundamental issue has been
the size of the project. BUA has consistently taken the position that
the large scale project would be necessary to create the quality mixed
use environment essential to the marketing of the space. BUA also held
that the high density of development was necessary to distribute the
fixed land costs to enough square feet of rentable space to achieve
financial feasibility. On the other hand, there were serious objections
to the environmental impacts that would result from high density and large
scale development. Particular attention was focused on the natural en-
vironment, as fears were expressed that high-rise construction to the
south of the Common and Garden would cast large shadows and seriously
jeopardize the quality of the adjacent public open space. There were
also fears that such a concentration of new construction, and the re-
sulting concentration of people, would seriously overburden the city's
infrastructure. Since most of the retail shoppers were expected to
drive in from the suburbs, as were many of the office workers, fears were
expressed about the resulting level of air pollution. The project would
also be served by the already overburdened Green Line of the subway
system, and some suggested that the marginal loading on the system would
create total chaos. These objections all focused on the size of the
project, and suggested reducing the size or total rejection of the
project.
[It should be pointed out that the approval process itself has
generated a number of additional issues. Primarily, they are the result
of the loss of credibility among the adversaries in the process. Much
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of the community now regularly rejects all BRA analysis as biased for BUA.
Many object to the proposed revelopment because it appears as if the BRA
is using its authority to benefit the developer at the expense of the less
politically potent members of the community. While these political issues
are certainly interesting, they are beyond the scope of this analysis,
which will instead attempt to focus on the underlying economic issues
that originally motivated the public discussion.]
After having resolved some of the basic political issues surrounding
the urban renewal plan, the latest chapter of the approval process began
in March, 1974. At that point, the fourth submission of the urban re-
newal plan to the DCA received a conditional approval from the second
Commissioner to have reviewed it. The final approval of the plan would
depend on the completion of an Environmental Impact Report consistent
with the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. In the process of
preparing the Environmental Impact Report, the BRA was instructed to seek
the advice of the Park Plaza community, and the BRA and the DCA proceeded
to fund the establishment of a Civic Advisory Council (CAC). Primary
responsibility for organizing the Environmental Impact Report (EIR)
was given to an outside consultant, The Saratoga Associates. The
Saratoga Associates worked with the BRA technical staff and the CAC
towards completion of the Report, which should be done by August 1, 1975.4
In a conscientious effort to address the basic economic and en-
vironmental issues, the EIR went beyond the testing of the single
development proposal advanced by the BUA. Instead, the EIR attempted
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to model the environmental impacts as a function of the basic develop-
ment program variables: development density, structural configuration,
and distribution of built space among alternative building uses. By
building such a model, Saratoga and the BRA hoped to be able to identify
clear constraints on the scale, density, and type of development. They
also felt that they would be able to protect the project from the ultimate
disaster: that the BUA proposal would be found to be environmentally un-
acceptable and would lead to total rejection of the urban renewal plan.
The BRA felt that the use of a model would open the door for a compromise
plan, perhaps at a lower density, or using up less land. During the
period, the developer maintained his position that he needed the maximum
density and scale to make the project work.
In its original conception, the Saratoga approach was comprised of
two sections: an Environmental Base Analysis, and a Development Program
Interpretation.5 Briefly, the Environmental Base analysis involved the
generation of a large matrix that related specific development activities
(excavation, use of space, acquisition of land, etc.) to specific para-
meters that described attributes of the environment. The Saratoga work
took a very broad view of the environment, including in their description
not only the natural environment, but also the built environment, the
economic environment, and the social-political environment. The matrix
was supposed to show how each specific development activity would impact
on environmental parameters. The Development Program Interpretation
attempted to limit the range of potential development schemes that were
to be tested to those that were "feasible." Schemes generated by the
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Development Program Interpretation process would be tested against the
environmental base model. The resulting changes in environmental para-
meters would be checked against some predetermined threshholds, to see
how significantly each development scheme violated environmental
constraints.
Unfortunately, while the Saratoga methodology is not difficult to
understand on the conceptual level, it has already proven to be extremely
difficult to implement. The Development Program Interpretation has been
abandoned altogether. Instead, the BRA has used its own judgment to
derive six alternative development schemes.6 While the Environmental
Base Analysis and testing have not been completed, the CAC has raised
many objections to the actual implemented methodology. Many members
of the CAC have already voiced their opinions that the BRA-Saratoga work
will not differentiate adequately the small development schemes from the
larger ones.
2.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis
One thing is clear: prior to resubmitting the urban renewal plan to
the DCA for final approval the BRA will have to decide on one of the
alternative development plans. Presumably, the decision will be made
"in the public interest," and will depend on how the BRA weighs, with
CAC advice, the benefits from development against the costs. The actual
decision will likely be very hard to make, both because of the difficult
measurement problems in assessing the costs and benefits, and because of
the interrelationship between economic gain and political power.
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In order to clarify the BRA's problem, it will be helpful to review
some basic propositions of welfare economics that have generally been
identified as "cost-benefit analysis." The fundamental rationale for
governmental intervention into economic activity is that collective action
to reallocate resources can result in an increase in "social welfare"
that could not have been achieved by the unhampered operation of the
private market alone. Cost-benefit analysis attempts to identify those
situations where governmental intervention will result in an increase in
social welfare. The need for governmental intervention arises when, for
one reason or another, the private market does not value goods at the
same price that consumers would be willing to pay, should they have the
opportunity.
When a private sector producer is considering production of a good,
he compares the cost of the inputs to the price he can get for the output.
For his purposes, the only relevant prices are those prevalent in the
marketplace. As long as the market value of the output exceeds the market
value of the inputs, he will produce the good. It doesn't matter to him
at all if the market prices don't reflect the true value of the inputs
or outputs. For example, when an industrial firm considers a production
process that pollutes the air, it will not include the cost of using up
that environmental resource in its calculation.
On the other hand, when the public evaluates the production of a
good, the public decision making authority must take a broader view of
the cost of inputs and value of outputs. Specifically, the public de-
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cision making authority must look for those inputs and outputs that have
been mispriced by the market. While the private firm attempts to max-
imize the net market value (the difference between market value of inputs
and outputs), the corresponding public objective is to maximize the net
social welfare (the difference between the aggregate consumption value of
inputs and outputs). 8
There are basic characteristics of some goods that cause their
market price to differ from the price that consumers would be willing to
pay. For purposes of this study, these goods will be referred to as
public goods. Steiner identifies three broad classes of public goods: 9
1. Public goods that result from the non-marketable services
of particular goods. Private production may often use
resources that private producers do not consider valuable,
or generate by-products that are unmarketable. The key to
these goods is the concept of appropriability. It is
difficult to imagine reasonable markets to transfer the
value of goods produced from the consumer to the producer.
The classical example is national defense; it is incon-
ceivable that the good would be, or could be, denied to
those who would choose not to pay for it. As a result,
we have elected the other course; to provide defense as
a collective public good and extract payment from all
through the police powers of the state.
2. Public goods that result from market imperfections.
Any of the traditional sources of market failure may
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cause an inefficient allocation of resources--a difference
between the opportunity cost of resources and their market
values. Market failure is generally attributed to imperfect
information, factor immobility, transaction costs, or monopoly
power.
3. Public goods that result from collective concern for the
quality of society. In some cases, society as a whole
decides that certain goods are more valuable to a member
of the group than he could afford to pay. In short, we
use public goods as a mechanism for the redistribution of
wealth among the members of society.
It should be clear from the nature of the public discussion about
Park Plaza that there are both substantial public inputs and outputs.
As noted above, the developer has tended to focus on the public outputs:
the upgrading of the Park Plaza area, the resulting increase in property
values around the site, the stimulation of general downtown economic
activity, increased employment in the construction and service industries,
and the attraction of industry from out of town. The opponents of the
project have tended to focus on the public inputs: the adverse environ-
mental impacts, the municipal services, the strain on the public infra-
structure, and the need for capital improvements to support the project.
If the BRA were to develop and own the project itself, the equation
for net public benefit would be completed with the addition of the non-
public costs and benefits: the market cost of constructing the development
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and the market value of the net revenues to be generated by the project.
The basic welfare economics formulation would have the BRA choose that
development alternative that maximized the difference between the cost
(both public and private) of the inputs and the value (both public and
private) of the outputs from the project.
In fact, the BRA must rely on BUA, the private developer, to assume
the cost of creating the development in return for the present value of
the net revenues. In as much as BUA is a profit maximizing firm, it will
only proceed if the market value of the revenues exceeds the market cost
of the factors to create the development. In addition, the BRA has the
capacity to tax away from the developer any excess economic profits, or
subsidize the developer should the costs exceed the benefits. In contract
terms, the developer acts as an agent for the city. The developer acquires
those resources that are purchaseable in the marketplace, and sells those
outputs that are marketable. In return for performing these services
for the public secotr, the private developer receives a return commensurate
to the risk incurred on his invested capital. In order for the public to
get the developer to act, the value of marketable outputs must exceed the
market cost of the inputs. But most importantly, the remainder of the
net market value created by development is recovered by the public sector
(through taxation) to be weighed against the other public inputs and outputs.
2.3 Public Assistance
Actually, the BRA has at its disposal a variety of mechanisms to
adjust the balance between the market values of inputs and outputs to
be borne by the private developer; to establish private feasibility.
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Traditionally, urban renewal relied on the "writing down" of land prices
by the federal government in order to reduce the costs to the private
developer. [The federal government would purchase the land through
eminent domain, and then sell it at a loss.] From the local point of
view this was a very effective strategy because the federal government
paid for most of the difference between the land acquisition and dis-
position prices. Some of the strategies below also involve local action
which creates external subsidies to the renewal process. Others involve
direct costs to the locality, either in the form of capital expenditures
or foregone future revenues. Still others involve policy decisions
which require public goods to be input into the redevelopment project.
1. The use of a development company organized pursuant to Section
121 of the General Laws of Massachusetts. When the developer
organizes the development entity in this form, the firm becomes
limited to a nominal dividend return of 6% on invested equity,
but the local government provides two substantial forms of
assistance to the developer:
a. The developer and the BRA can negotiate a long term real
estate tax agreement which fixes property taxes as per-
centage of the gross rental income of the development.
Normally, property taxes on real estate are computed by
applying the annual tax rate to the assessed valuation
of the property. Currently, Boston's property tax rate
is almost 20%, i.e., the annual tax bill is about 20%
of the official assessed value. While this tax burden
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would seem intolerably excessive, the reality is that few
properties have an assessed valuation that resembles the true
market value. The system therefore places a heavier burden
on new developments; often so heavy a burden that new private
development becomes infeasible. In an effort to encourage
new downtown development, and particularly the Prudential
Center, the State allowed the municipality the option to
negotiate 40 year tax agreements. Not only does the neg-
otiated rate produce a lower tax burden in the early years
of the life of the development, it greatly reduces the
uncertainty about future property taxes. Otherwise, the
property tax burden could change as a result of increasing
tax rates or increasing assessments. 1 0
b. The use of eminent domain to acquire land for development.
As noted, state law allows the use of eminent domain for the
acquisition of blighted land as a public purpose use of the
power. The use of this power really amounts to a transfer
of value to the developer from the current land owners.
The eminent domain procedure insures that land owners do
not receive the marginal value of their land to the new re-
developed use. The BRA will acquire the parcels at the
market value based on their current use. The price paid
for the land will not reflect any increase in value to
each parcel as a result of their inclusion into a larger
agglomeration. While the courts may award land owners some
additional value, partially reflecting the post-taking value
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value of the land, there are additional advantages to the
developer. While there is uncertainty as to the outcome of
contested takings in terms of the final settlement price,
the developer has the effective use of the land at the point
of the taking. This can substantially accelerate the de-
velopment schedule over the usual alternative, where the
entire process waits for final conclusion of the negotiation
with the owners of holdout parcels. Given the history of
eminent domain awards, and the required appraisals for the
taking procedure, the developer can generally estimate the
size of the awards on contested parcels.1 1
c. The nominal limitation of return to equity to 6% does not
affect the real return on equity. In fact, the return limit-
ation does not consider a number of the cash flows to the
equity investors. In some cases, this limitation may amount
to effective rent control, limiting the amount that the
developer can charge for space to a function of the cost of
the project and the operating expenses. The use of a limited
dividend development company therefore amounts to a transfer
from the developer to the project tenants. (This should not
be surprising since the original use of the limited dividend
company was in the development of subsidized housing.) In
the case of Park Plaza, this limitation has no effective
.
1 2
meaning.
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2. The BRA can change the zoning of land to allow increased density
of development. By using land more intensely, the developer
reduces the unit cost of rentable space. As pointed out above,
the actual cost to the municipality of this strategy have become
the focus of the political controversy.
3. The city can make capital contributions to the project. There
are a number of alternative forms of contribution that have been
discussed by the BRA with respect to Park Plaza:
a. The city has offered to contribute the land now used for
city streets to the developer at little or no cost. (In
the larger scale designs, several street parcels would be
converted to building use.)
b. The BRA has offered to assume the cost of new streets in
the project, as well as utility extensions, water and sewer
systems, and other pieces of the project infrastructure.
c. The BRA has already contributed a substantial portion of
the developer's front end costs, or "pre-development expenses."
Most of this has been in the form of planning for the project
that has been done by the BRA staff or BRA paid consultants,
and includes the entire cost of the environmental impact
analysis process.13
4. The city could consider providing financing for part of the
development cost through municipal revenue bonds. Funds are
borrowed by the municipality against the security of promised
revenue from the development. Since the holders of such bonds
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are exempt from federal income tax on the interest income, the
required yield is lower than on equivalent taxable securities.
The difference in the costs of funds obtained through the use
of revenue bonds amounts to a federal subsidy to the project.
The BRA has discussed legislation by the state that would allow
the use of revenue bonds to finance the residential and parking
garage portions of Park Plaza. At this point, revenue bonds
could not be used.
In summary, the BRA's decision problem can be formulated conceptually
as a constrained optimization. The objective function consists of max-
imizing the net social welfare value from redevelopment of the site. This
net value is the difference between the sum of social opportunity and
market costs of inputs and the sum of the social and market value of the
outputs. The decision variables available to the BRA consist of the
strategies identified above: determination of the basic development program
and determination of the degree and nature of public involvement. Finally,
the determination of the decision variables must be subjected to the con-
straint of private feasibility: the value of marketable private outputs
must exceed the cost of private inputs.
This thesis attempts to estimate the marketable value of private
outputs from development, and the market cost of the inputs. The net
difference between these costs and values can be thought of as the max-
imum price that a private firm would be willing to pay for the opportunity
to develop the Park Plaza site. This value will be referred to as the
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residual market value of the development. The residual market value of
the development is also the maximum amount that the public sector can
extract from the private developer to be weighed against the net public
cost of the development. Presuming that the BRA sees no social purpose
in transferring wealth to the private developer, it should adjust its
decision variables so as to fully recover the residual market value.
The first section of the work will present a model for computing
the residual market value of a development alternative as a function of
the BRA decision variables. This section will also review the available
market data and establish the basic assumptions about the prices of
marketable inputs and outputs of the project.
The second section will compute the residual market value for
alternative development schemes. Specifically, the six alternatives
developed by the BRA will be examined. This section will also compare
the use of alternative subsidy mechanisms by the BRA, and compute the
marginal rate of substitution of one mechanism for another at the point
of private feasibility. The last part of this section will check the
sensitivity of the computed residual market value to the market price
assumptions of the first section. This sensitivity analysis is critical
because of the basic inadequacy of the BRA generated market data. The
sensitivity analysis will note explicitely the relationship between a
change in a market assumption and the resulting change in the residual
market value.
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In concluding this section, it is important to clarify the objectives
of this thesis. The thesis does not attempt to select the best develop-
ment alternative for Park Plaza, nor does it attempt to specify the
mechanisms that the BRA should utilize to transfer value to or from the
developer. These decisions depend on an assessment of the public costs
associated with each set of alternative choices; and that assessment is
beyond the scope of this work. This thesis attempts only to provide data
on one variable in the more complicated equation that the BRA must con-
sider in its evaluation of alternative courses of action.
Nor does this thesis depend on a specification of the BRA decision
making methodology. It should be clear from the very conceptual descrip-
tion of the BRA's problem, and from the experience of the Saratoga
Associates, that quantification of the public costs and benefits will
be an extremely difficult task. One might make an argument that such
quantification efforts would clearly be fruitless, and that the evaluation
of the relative costs and benefits should be left to the shrifting of a
political process. In any case, whether the BRA attempts to quantify a
constrained optimization problem, attempts to constrain feasible alter-
natives using the Saratoga approach, or attempts to choose by the seat
of their pants, it will clearly have to weigh the share of the market
value of development that the public can capture as a public benefit.
Regardless of the measurement problems that afflict the estimation of
other public costs and benefits, the measurement of the residual market
value, because of its very nature, becomes a feasible project. This
exercise, though, can not insure that the BRA will make an optimal de-
cision, or even that it will make a good decision.
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CHAPTER 3
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE: PRELIMINARY DEFINITION
The purpose of this study is to estimate the "Residual Market Value"
of development alternatives for the Park Plaza redevelopment area.
Residual Market Value (RMV) has been loosely defined in the introductory
discussion as the difference between the market value of the outputs
from the development project and the market cost of the inputs. This
definition is clear in the context of a single period, tax free, certain
world. At this point, a more precise and operational definition is
essential to extend the analysis to cover these complications.
In a certain world with no taxes, the RMV of an all equity financed
development alternative is the net present value of the cash flows that
represent the purchase and sale of products in the marketplace. Using
conventional notation,
N
(1) RV = 1 [(Rt - Et)/(1 + k)t]
t=O
where Rt is the cash revenue in period t, Et is the expenditure in period
t, k is the required return on equity funds, and N is the number of periods
in the economic life of the project. Throughout this work, an alternative
notation to that of Eq. (1) will be employed.
(2) RMV = PVkN[Rt - Et]
In the use of the present value operator, the first subscript indicates
the interest rate (or vector of one period interest rates) to be used in
discounting, and the second subscript the time horizon over which cash
flows should be discounted. In some cases, both these pieces of in-
formation will be carried in one subscript.
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The actual values for Rt and Et will be a function of the design
of the development, and of prevailing prices in the market. In the
early years of the project, Et will primarily be comprised of construc-
tion expenditures, which will be a function of the architectural design,
the size, the scale, and the quality of the development. After con-
struction is completed, Et will represent the operating expenses, which
will also be a function of the systems designed into the buildings. The
revenues generated in rent will depend on the number, amount, and type
of building space products produced. Those basic design characteristics
of each development alternative that determine the cash flows over the
life of the project will be described as the "architectural program."
Once the architectural program defining a development alternative
is selected, the pattern of pre-tax, pre-financing cash flows is also
determined (by reference to market prices). These cash flows can then
be discounted to calculate the RMV. In this simplified world, the
municipality can appropriate the RMV from the private firm by appro-
priating part of the cash flow from any period. Provided that the
municipality uses the same cost of capital as does the private de-
veloper, the pattern of appropriated cash flows can satisfy either of
two constraints. Let Tt be the "tax" appropriated in period t. Then,
in order to insure that the private firm will engage in the development
project, the public must choose the set of T 's so that the remaining
t
cash flows to equity have a non-negative net present value. The value
of the project to the private firm can be written as
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(3) PVE = 0 =PVkN [Rt -Et Tt I
= PVk,N[Rt - Et] PVkN[Tt]
(4) = RMV - PVk,N[Tt]
which provides the alternative formulation. The city can select any
pattern of tax payments with present value equal to RMV.
Under these simplified assumptions, the present value of each ap-
propriated tax dollar to the municipality is equal to the reduction in
the present value of the project to the private firm as a result of the
loss of that dollar. Restated, this implies that the RMV can be com-
puted by either:
a. Discounting the pre-tax cash flows as established by
the architectural program
b. Discounting the tax payments received by the municipality
(and set so that PVE = 0)
Unfortunately, the introduction of federal income taxes demonstrates
that these two methods don't in general give the same result. Assume for
the moment a simplified version of the federal tax system. Income taxes
are collected in each period when the net cash flow is greater than zero,
and are equal to some percentage of the cash flow. In periods when the
net cash flow is negative, no taxes are paid or refunded. Also assume
that the specific project under consideration requires a substantial cash
outflow at time zero to build the building (instantaneously) and that
rental income exceeds operating expenses in all periods thereafter.
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Under the federal income tax system, payment of local taxes is deductible
from taxable income. Under these assumptions, rule (a) above computes
the RMV by discounting the cash flows prior to payment of local tax, but
after the payment of federal income tax.
(5) RMV = -E0 + PVkN[(1-s)(Rt - Et)]
where s is the federal income tax rate. The expression can be rewritten,
(6) RMV = (1-s)PVkN[Rt 
- Et] - E0
On the other hand, rule (b) computes the RMV as the net present
value of the tax revenues collected by the local government from the
development. Assuming that a lump sum payment is collected at the time
of construction in addition to payments received over the life of the
project, the
(7) RMV = T0 + PV kN[T ].
To find feasible values for T and Tt, we need to write an expression
ot
for the value of the equity, equate the net present value of the equity
to 0, and solve in terms of T0 and Tt'
The present value of the equity can be written as
(8) PVE = 0 = -E0 - T0 + PVk,N[(l-s)(Rt - Et t]
T + (1-s)PVkN [Tt] = PVkN[(l-s)(Rt 
- Et) - E0
(9) T0 + PVkN[Tt] = (1s)PVkN[Rt - E] + (s)PVk,N [Tt]
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Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (7),
(10) RMV = (1-s)PVkN[Rt - Et] - E 0 + (s)PVkN Tt]
If we designate the RMV as calculated by rule (a) as RMVa, and that
calculated by rule (b) as RMV , we can return to Eq. (6) to show that
(11) RMVb = RMV a+ (s)PVk [T ]
bM aM k,Nt
Clearly, the difference between the two approaches is the present
value of the tax savings to the private firm as a result of the de-
ductibility of local tax payments. Rule (a) does not account for the
subsidy provided by the federal government. For each dollar of RMVa
appropriated by the local governmental unit during the operation of the
project (for t greater than 0) the federal government provides the private
firm with an additional s dollars. In order to capture the full value
available, rule (a) has to be amended to include the additional cash
flows available to the local government simply as a result of their
staking a claim on the underlying cash flows of the project.
It is convenient to summarize this point in terms of more familiar,
but analogous, financial issue. It is reasonable to think of the local
governmental claim on the cash flows generated by the project as a
special type of debt. While the local government may or may not make
an actual cash contribution to the project, for federal tax purposes,
the "interest" on the loan is deductible. In as much as the local
government is not taxed by the federal government on its "investment
income," the use of this source of finance invokes the same federal
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subsidy as does the use of market acquired debt. The key concept is that
the transfer of a dollar of net cash flow is worth more to the trans-
feree than it cost the transferor to give it up. Just as the federal
government pays part of the cost of the private firm's use of market
debt, it pays part of the cost of appropriation by the city. While the
above discussion confined itself to a world of certainty, the results
are identical to those showing the tax value of the "debt" financing even
under conditions of uncertainty.1 We will return to this point in more
detail below, particularly when it comes to the determination of the
appropriate discount rates to use on various claims on the project.
In order to capture the effects of "leverage" on the value of the
project, the study will calculate the RMV as the present value of the
cash flows to the municipality. In the context of the general financial
analysis, this approach corresponds to evaluating each claim on an asset
in terms of the present value of the cash flows allocated to it.
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CHAPTER 4
THE VALUE OF CASH FLOWS GENERATED BY NEW DEVELOPMENT
Returning to the discussion in the first section, there are con-
straints on the "tax program" (the pattern of T t) that the city can
apply to the Park Plaza project. Under Section 121, taxes collected by
the city during the operation of the project must be a fixed percentage
of the gross rent collected for the year. During the construction
period (prior to occupancy) taxes are assessed in proportion to con-
struction completion, achieving the level expected at occupancy when
construction is completed. Therefore, the entire tax program can be
described in terms of one variable, the percentage of gross rent ap-
propriated by the city. It was also pointed out that the city could make
capital contributions to the project, that is, pay for part of the
original construction cost. While this contribution could be made at
any point during the construction period, we will assume that public
capital contributions are made in proportion to private construction
expenditures. Again, this allows the use of capital contributions to
be described in terms of one variable, the percentage of the total con-
struction cost to be contributed by the public.
The RMV is the net present value of the capital contributions and
the tax payments. The feasible programs of capital contributions and
tax payments are determined by the private feasibility constraint. In
the case of a leveraged real estate development, both the net present
value of the debt and equity must be non-negative. As will be seen, the
after federal tax value of the equity can be expressed in terms of the
architectural program (which defines the pre-tax and pre-financing cash
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flows), the financial program (which defines the structure of private
claims on the cash flows), the federal tax structure (which defines the
federal government's claims on the cash flows) and the local tax program.
The value of the debt is determined by the architectural and financial
programs. This section first generates an expression for the value of
the equity based on the architectural, financial, federal tax, and local
tax programs. It then solves the private feasibility constraints in
terms of the local tax program, to identify the combinations of capital
contributions and tax collections that achieve feasibility. The net
present value of such programs is then calculated (i.e., the RMV).
The value of the equity will be computed as the present value of
the after tax cash flows to the equity position over the period that the
project is held, plus the present value of the after tax cash flow from
the sale of the project.
4.1 Operating Cash Flows
The cash operating income, before taxes and financing, in each
period is the difference between the rent collected and operating ex-
penses.
(1) O = R - Et t t
where 0t is the operating cash flow in period t, Rt is the rent collected
in period t, and Et is the cash operating expense in period t.
In addition, in each period there will be a cash transfer to the
two other sources of financing for the project, the market debt position
and the local government. Let Kt be the total cash payment on the debt
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to the private lender in period t, and Tt be the property tax payment
to the city in period t. Then, the pre-federal tax cash flow in period t,
(2) Ct = 0 - K - Tt
For federal tax purposes, some cash flows are not deductible from
gross income, while other non-cash expenses are deductible. Specifically,
depreciation is a non-cash expense deductible from taxable income, while
that portion of debt payments that represents the return of principal,
as opposed to the payment of interest, is not deductible. Let Dt be
the depreciation as computed for tax purposes in period t, and It be
that portion of the transfers to the debt position that represents the
payment of interest for federal tax purposes. Then, the taxable income
(from the federal government's perspective) is
(3) F = 0 - T - I - Dt
where F is taxable income in period t.
t
The federal government collects taxes in each period by applying
the investor's marginal tax rate to the taxable income. Let g be the
marginal tax rate of the equity investor, and Gt be the federal tax
bill in period t.
(4) Gt ge(Ft
-g (0 - T - I - D )
A note on the sign of Ft and Gt is in order here. There is no
reason why Ft should be positive in every period, and in many types
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of tax shelter real estate, a substantial portion of the value comes
from tax savings that occur because Dt (a non-cash expense) is so large.1
Throughout this paper, it will be assumed that should Ft be negative,
the investor will have other taxable income against which to apply the
net loss from the project. This is not an unrealistic assumption,
particularly since the predictability of such net loss years has led to
substantial legal planning to insure that the tax losses are allocated
to an investor who can take advantage of them. An analysis of the
alternative structures that are used to achieve the desired distribution
of tax benefits is beyond the scope of this work, but can be found
elsewhere.2 It is sufficient for our purposes to note that in periods
when F is negative, G will be assumed to be negative also and will
t t
represent a federal tax subsidy to the equity position as opposed to
a tax collection.
The after tax cash flow to the equity, call it Yt, is simply the
difference between pre-tax cash flows and tax payments.
(5) Yt = Ct Gt
= 0 - T - K - g (0 - T - I - D )
t t t et t t t
= O(t leg) 
- Tt (lge) + D (ge ) + I (ge) - Kt
Yt now represents the after tax cash flows accrueing to the equity 
as a
result of the revenues generated by the operation of the project. The
cash flows from the operation of the project must be adjusted to include
the cash flows required to create the project.
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4.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Let A be the construction expenditure in period t. A is dis-
t t
tinguished from Et in that At is not deductible for tax purposes. In
other words, A represents the cash expenditures on capital assets in
t
period t, while Et represents the cash expenses. During the actual
construction and development of a real estate project, a substantial
portion of the expenditures will be considered as capital for tax
purposes, but there will also be some deductible expenses. We will
return to this distinction below, at the point of allocating actual con-
struction estimates between At and Et.
As a basic identity, the construction expenditure (A t) represents
a cash outflow to the equity to the extent that the expenditure is not
paid for by the locality, through a capital contribution, or the debt,
through the advance of loan funds. Letting Ut be the capital contribution
from the municipality in period t, and Mt be the advance of mortgage funds
in period t, we have the cash flow from equity required during construction,
(6) Y = -A + U + Mt
Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) can now be added and reorganized:
(7) Y = -At + 0t
+M - K
t t
+U - T
t t
-g (0 - It - Tt - D t)
It is interesting to note the structure of Eq. (7). The first line in-
dicates the cash flow in each period to the untaxed all-equity-financed
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project. The second line indicates the pre-tax cash flows that result
from the use of market debt. The third line indicates the pre-tax cash
flows that result from local government's appropriation of cash flows.
The last line indicates the cash flow in each period taken by the
federal government in income taxes.
The net present value of the equity can now be expressed as the
present value of Yt plus the present value of the sale of the project
(the salvage value). Without specifying the time horizons or appropriate
discount rates, the present value to the equity position of the flow of
Y t's is the sum of the present value of the components of Yt
(8) PVE = PV [Yt
= PV [0 - A ]
e t t
+ PV [M - K ]e t t
+ PV [U - T ]e t t
- PV [ge(t t - Tt - D ]
+ PV e[S]
where S is the after tax cash flow to the equity at the time of the sale.
It is clear that at private feasibility, PVE = 0, and that Eq. (8) could
be easily rearranged to solve for the PV [T ] as a function of PV [U t]
and the other variables. Up to this point, all that has been said would
be applicable to any leveraged investment project on which there are two
classes of debt. In short, before solving for the feasible combinations
of U and Tt, there is a wealth of additional information specifying
tt
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the patterns of cash flows of the project that can be input into the
formulation. This information results from specification of the archi-
tectural, financial, and tax programs.
As indicated at the outset of this section, the pattern of capital
contributions Ut and real estate taxes over the life of the project could
be expressed as percentages of construction expenditures and rental in-
come respectively. Let U be the percentage of capital expenditure in
each period paid for by the municipality. Then
(9) Ut = U (Atd.
Let T be the percentage of gross rental income appropriated by the local
government in property taxes. Then
(10) Tt = T(Rt
4.3 Market Debt
We will assume here that the project employs market debt as it is
conventionally used in real estate development. There are generally two
types of debt used during the course of a real estate development: a
construction loan and a permanent mortgage. The construction loan on a
rental development is a short term extension of credit to pay for a
portion of the construction cost. Although the loan is secured by the
real estate and attached improvements, the real security against which
such loans are advanced is the permanent take-out (the purchase of the
short term paper by the long term lender.) The long term lender is
lending instead against the net cash flows generated by the development.
Very briefly, the practice of separating the debt over time is usually
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explained in terms of the desire of institutional lenders to assume the
different risk associated with the two types of loans, and the relative
attractiveness of the different maturities.3
The construction loan is generally advanced in proportion to com-
pletion of construction. While the construction lender would always
like to have reserved enough funds to be in a position to complete
construction should the contractor not be able, the contractor is equally
interested in having the construction lender advance extra funds to cover
the contractor's own working capital requirements. Often, the construc-
tion lender will hold a "retainage" on the contractor, hold back a certain
percentage of the funds estimated to be required until the job is complete.
While interest is nominally computed and paid by the borrower on a periodic
basis, the construction lender is not averse to lending the funds out of
which interest is paid. Therefore, in cash terms, it is best to think of
the construction loan as advances against a single balloon repayment. For
tax purposes, though, interest expense accrues each period. When the de-
velopment is occupied to a pre-specified level, or when the construction
is complete, the construction lender is paid out by the long term lender.
We will assume here that in each period during construction funds
are advanced in proportion to the expenditures during the period plus an
additional advance to cover accrued interest. Let m be the proportion
of capital expenditure funded by the construction lender. Then,
(11) Mt = m (At + It
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To the first approximation, the interest accrued at the end of each period
is the construction interest rate times the outstanding balance advanced
at the end of the period. (This approximation gets better when the size
of a period in the analysis approaches one month, which is generally the
period between construction advances.) Let ic be the market rate of
interest on the construction loan. Then, the interest due at the end
of period
(12) Il = icA 1
12 c 1(1 + ic + mA2
t t-x
(13) It ic (M) A (l+ i )
x=l
At the refinancing date, say t*, the cash repayment to the construction
lender, Kt* is
t* t*-x
(14) Ktt* m A ( + iC
x=1
While the construction lender was assumed here to have advanced against
construction activity, the permanent lender will be assumed to advance
funds against the cash flows over the project life. Specifically, it
will be assumed that the long term lender will purchase some percentage
of the net operating cash flow after local real estate taxes. Put
another way, the long term lender will capitalize part of the cash flow
available after the payment of local taxes (which have credit priority).
We will further assume that the long term lender makes a level payment
mortgage with no balloon payment. In terms of the variables, the lender
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will compute the present value of a level stream of payments such that
(15) K = k(O' - T')
where O' and T' represent the expected operating income and tax payments
for substantial occupancy of the project. (Up to this point no assump-
tions about 0t have been made, particularly with respect to changing price
levels. To the extent that inflation increases the operating margin over
time, the project would have an increasing debt capacity. One could
imagine a formulation in which the debt level is continuously adjusted
to some debt limit function of the cash flow. That formulation would
not appear to fit comfortably in this situation, primarily because of
the transaction costs associated with raising the marginal real estate
debt. Without any comprehensive data, I think it would be fair to say
that commercial real estate does get refinanced to take advantage of
inflated cash flows, but the time between such refinancings is large.
We will return to this point when we consider the value of selling or
otherwise disposing of the project.) In any case, we will assume here
that the long term lender looks to the projected cash flow at reasonably
current prices when establishing a debt limit.
Having established the cash flow against which the construction
lender will finance, determination of the term of the mortgage and the
market rate of interest allow computation of the long term mortgage
advance. Assuming that the long term mortgage is provided at the same
time that the construction loan is paid off, the amount of the loan can
be designated as Mt*'
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(16) Mt = PV. [k(O' - T')]
p
where i is the market interest rate on long term debt, and n is the
p
number of periods in the mortgage.
[Depending on the values of in and k, it would not be unreasonable
to expect Mt* to exceed Kt* by some amount equivalent to a retainage as
mentioned above.]
In the appendix, it is demonstrated with simple algebra that the
interest portion of each payment of a level payment mortgage can be
written as:
(17) It = K - Mt*(K/Mt* - i )(1 + i )t-l
To summarize conceptually the last few pages on the use of debt, the use
of several assumptions about the financial program has enabled substitu-
tion for Ut' t' Mt' t, and It in terms of Ot, Rt, and At.
4.4 Depreciation
The last flow from Eq. (8) to be considered is depreciation. All
types of investment real estate are eligible for some form of accelerated
depreciation. The allowable depreciation in each period, Dt' is a
function of the depreciation method selected, the depreciable life of
the asset, and the depreciable basis. The depreciable basis of an asset
is in general the cost to the owner. In the case of the leveraged pro-
ject, the amount of the loan is includible in the basis of the owner
carrying the liability. Like much of the rest of the tax laws, deprecia-
tion is not a particularly economic concept. While the actual investment
in a depreciable asset occurs over time, tax depreciation does not begin
-46- 4. p4f7
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until the asset is completed and put into use. Thereafter, additional
contributions, if necessary, add to the depreciable basis.
As indicated above, the total investment in capital assets at any
point in time is the accumulation of the At up to that point. At sub-
d
stantial completion, call it time t , the total investment in capital
assets is
d
t
(18) A = A
x=1
There are two adjustments that must be made in determining the depreciable
basis. First, that portion of capital contribution made by the munici-
pality is not owned by the private firm (or else it would have been
taxable income) and is therefore not depreciable. The total capital
expenditure must therefore be reduced by the total public capital con-
tribution. Second, land is a non-depreciable capital asset for tax
purposes since there is no clear limitation to its useful life. There-
fore, that portion of A that is allocable to the purchase of land must
be deducted to determine the depreciable basis. The total depreciable
basis can then be written as
(19) B = A - U - L
where B is the total depreciable basis, U is the total public capital
contribution, and L is the total cost of land.
The tax laws allow for the depreciation of the components of a
building separately, as opposed to depreciating the building as a whole.
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The advantage of component depreciation is that some parts of the building
have a shorter useful life and provide deductions in earlier periods. In
the case of a staged multi-use development, depreciation by component is
a necessity. Buildings used for residential use can be depreciated faster
than commercial buildings. Also, some parts of the development may be
substantially completed, and hence depreciable, before others. For ex-
ample, if an office tower were scheduled for earliest construction it
would be depreciable when completed even though an adjacent residential
structure in the project were not complete.
In order to capture these effects, the total depreciable basis will
be allocated to components. Each component will then be depreciated at
the appropriate point in time, with the appropriate method, and over the
right service life. From the appendix, the allowable depreciation in each
period for each component can be expressed in terms of its depreciable
basis BJ (where ZBJ= B), date of substantial completion td, service life
N., and q, the rate of acceleration of declining balance depreciation
J
(i.e., q = 2 for double declining balance depreciation).
d
(20) D = B(q/N.)(1 - q/N.)
t 3
Total depreciation in period t from the entire development is then
(21) Dt = D
J
4.5 Pattern of Operating Cash Flows
Returning to the pattern of operating income over time, we will here assume
that both expected operating revenues and operating expenses will grow over
time at a constant rate from their respective expected values at the point
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of substantial occupancy. This assumption is based on the proposition
that after a development has been rented up, the vacancy level will
remain fairly constant, as will the package of goods and services in the
operating budget, and that changes in nominal income over time primarily
reflect changes in price levels.
Again using the prime notation to designate cash flows at the point
of substantial occupancy,
(22) R = R'(1 + z )tt
t r
(23) E = E'(1 + z )tt
t e
where t' is the date of substantial occupancy, zr is the growth rate of
rental income, and ze is the growth rate of operating expenses. Prior
to substantial occupancy, Rt and Et will depend on the occupancy level.
The total rental income will increase as the building is rented up until
it reaches R' at t'. We will here assume that occupancy grows linearly
over time and that rental income prior to substantial occupancy will be
proportionate to t. There are several arguments against this assumption.
Actual rent up will be somewhat seasonal. Residential occupancy will
increase more rapidly in the summer and fall than in the rest of the year.
Commercial occupancy will be almost stable in the first quarter (after
Christmas rush). It is also likely that if occupancy begins before con-
struction is complete, then rent up will be slower before construction
is complete than after completion. But these effects involve a level of
detail of assumptions that is inappropriate given the overall lack of
definition of the project at this stage. Let t" be the point of initial
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occupancy, then Rt between t" and t' is
(24) Rt = (t - t") R'/(t' - t")
A certain portion of the operating budget at substantial occupancy
will be fixed costs that will have to be incurred at initial occupancy.
The rest of the operating budget will be assumed to be variable costs
that grow in proportion to the occupancy level. Therefore, during rent
up,
(25) Et = E' + (t - t")(E' - E")/(t' - t")
where E" is the non-variable operating expense incurred at initial
occupancy.
There will also be expenses incurred prior to occupancy. These
expenses correspond to the developer's deductible overhead, the ordinary
business expenses incurred by the private firm during the development of
the project that do not have to be capitalized for tax purposes. (For
example, the development firm's rent, telephone bill, salaries, etc.)
Again, this work has not said too much about the actual legal form of the
private firm engaging in this project, and it should be clear that some
expenses will not be deductible depending on who incurs them. For ex-
ample, if the project is developed by one group that hires an outside
contractor to do the construction, payments by the development group to
the contractor to cover his ordinary expenses will not be deductible by
the development group, but must be capitalized (then depreciated.) We
will assume here that there is no identity of interest between the de-
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veloper and the contractor, and that all payments to the contractor will
be capital (i.e., an A t). All deductible expenses during the construction
and development period will therefore be assumed to have been incurred by
the development firm. Deductible expenses will be incurred evenly from
the start of the development process (t=0), until substantial completion
d
at td. During this period
(26) Et = E0
where E0 is the deductible per-period overhead development expense.
4.6 Pattern of Capital Expenditures
We now come to the pattern of capital expenditures. As indicated
in the section on depreciation, there are two components to capital
expenditures, those on land, and those on building construction. The
acquisition of land is a clearly identifiable event, even in the crude
description that we have of development alternatives. The cash outflow
for land acquisition can also be directly identified, and expressed as
L at t
In discussing construction expenditures, it is best to think again
in terms of the components of a development alternative. A component
can be loosely defined as a discrete building or architectural element
devoted to a single predominant use. The most important characteristic
of a component for our purposes is that it is physically constructed in
a continuous and steady fashion. The time of completion of a component
dj has already been designated as t., at which point depreciation begins.
c
Let t. be the start of construction of component j. Note that there may
be several periods between land acquisition and the actual start of
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L c
construction. In a phased development, the delay between t and t. canJ
be several years. From Eq. (19), the total cash outflow from the equity
position during that period is B., while the total construction ex-J
penditure (including the public capital contribution) is A -L. As was
assumed above, public capital contribution will be in direct proportion
to private expenditure, and private expenditure will be in proportion
to total capital expenditure.
Again assuming linearity, construction expenditure in each period
during construction will be equal. On most building construction
projects, there is a period in the middle of the construction process
over which expenditures are nearly level. While there is also generally
a short period at both the start and finish of the process in which ex-
penditures are slower, this can be approximated simply in the linear model
by shortening the construction period at both ends. Then, the capital
expenditure per period during construction is,
(27) A = (A. - L)/(t - t.)
t J J J
for component j.
The corresponding pattern of public capital contributions during
construction is simply the public's proportionate share,
d c
(28) U = U(A L)/(t. - t.).
Having established the pattern of At, we can return to the con-
struction loan, and substitute the results. From Eq. (13), the con-
struction interest in period t is
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t t-x(29) it = ic(m) A (1 + ic)t c xA ci
x=1
Considering only the construction capital expenditures (i.e., excluding
land) A 's are all equal. For equal A 's, the appendix demonstrates that
x- t
(30) It = m(A )[1 + i - 1]
Substituting for A , during the construction period the construction
interest allocable to construction expenditures is,
d t-t
(31) 1c = m(A L)/(td t )( + it ct 3 3 3 c
The construction interest allocable to the advance to purchase land
L
is simply compounded from the time of the land purchase, t ,
(32) I = m(L)(i )(1 + i )tt
t c c
After construction is complete, the construction loan may not be
immediately refinanced by the permanent take out. While advances will
stop, interest will continue to accrue. We therefore need an expression
d
for the interest in the periods between t , the completion of construction,
and t*, the date of the permanent refinancing. At the end of construction,
the outstanding balance on the construction loan is computed by dividing
the interest payment by the interest rate. Thereafter, interest accrues
simply compounded. For t between td and t*,
c - d ctd-tc t-td+1
(33) I = M[(A. - L)/(t - t c)][(1 + i ) t ~ -1](1 + i ) ttd+t 3 c c
4.7 Summary of Operating Cash Flows
We can now summarize the assumptions and substitutions. Repeating
Eq. (7), the net cash flow after tax to the equity position in period t is
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Y = -A + 0 + M - K + U - T
t t t t t t t
- g( 
- Tt - Dt
At - Capital Expenditures
Land Acquisition
Y = -L
t
Construction Expenditures
Yt = -(A-L)/(t d-t c)
for t = tL
for tc t < t
Ot = Operating Income
Rent up revenues
Yt R' (t-t")/(t'-t")
Rent after substantial occupancy
Yt = R' (1 + zr t-t'
for t" < t < t'
for t > t'
Development Expenses
Y =E
t
for t < t'
Rent up Expenses
Yt = -E" - (t-t")[(E' - E")/(t'-t")
Expenses after substantial occupancy
Y = -E'(1 + z )t-t'
Mt - Private Debt Advances
Construction Loan Advances
To cover Land Acquisition
for t = tLY t =m(L)
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for t" < t < t'
for t > t'
To cover Interest on Land Acquisition
L
Y = m(L)(i )(1 + i c)tt
To cover Capital Construction Advances
Yt = M(A-L)/td-tc)
for tL < t < t*
for tc < t < td
To cover Interest on Construction Advances
Yt = m(A-L)/(t d-t c)[(l + ic t-tc-1]
- d_ c Mt-tc
= m(AL)/(tt )[(1 +ci -1](I + i )c
for tc <t td
t-t +1
for td < t < t*
Permanent Loan Advance
for t = t*
Kt - Repayments on Private Debt
Repayment of Construction Loan
To cover repayment of Land Loan and Interest
L
Y = -m(L)(1 + i )t +
t c
for t = t*
To cover repayment of Construction Advances and Interest
d c t*-tc t*-td
Y = -m[(A-L)/(t 
-t )][(1 + i 
-(1 + i )
*[(l + i 2, c]
Repayment of Permanent Loan
Yt = -k(R'(l - T) - E')
U - Public Capital Contributions
t
For Land Acquisition
for t = t*
for t* < t < t*+n
for t = tLY = U(L)
-56-
Yt = PV.i , [k(R'(1 - T) - E')]
For Construction Expenditures
Yt U(A-L)/td - t )
T - Local Taxes
t
During Rent up
Yt = -T(R')(t-t")/(t'-t")
After substantial occupancy
Yt= -T(R')(1 + z tt
It Interest on Long Term Debt
t-t*
Yt =K - Mt*(K/Mt* ip)(1 + i )
D - Depreciation
t d
Y = B(q/N)(1 - q/N)tt
t
for tc < t < td
for t" < t < t'
for t > t'
for t* < t < t*+n
for td < t < t d+N
[A(1-U)-L](q/N)(1 - q/N)t-td
To complete the summary, the following is a listing of the variables
that determine the pattern of Yt above.
Architectural
A-
L =
R'=
r
E'=
E"f=
E4=
Z =
Program
Total Capital Construction Cost
Total Land Cost
Rental Income at substantial occupancy
Growth rate of rental income after occupancy
Operating Expense at substantial occupancy
Operating Expense at initial occupancy
Development Expense per period
Growth rate of expenses after occupancy
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tL = time of land purchase
t = start of construction
td = substantial completion
t" = initial occupancy
t = substantial occupancy
Financial Program
m = percentage of capital expenditure funded with
construction debt
i = market rate of interest on construction debt
c
t* = date of repayment of construction loan
k = percentage of after local tax cash flow
allocated to long term debt
i = market rate of interest on long term debt
p
n = term of long term debt
Federal Income Tax Program
ge= Marginal tax rate of equity firm
q = Rate of accelerated depreciation
N = Depreciation Life of Building
Local Tax Program
U = Percentage of Capital expenditure Funded by
Local Capital Contributions
T = Percentage of Rental Income Appropriated for
Local Taxes
4.8 Cash Flow From Project Disposition
In addition to the cash flows to the equity position over the life
of the development project, we must consider the cash flows that result
from the sale of the development. At the time of the sale, the project
-58-
owners must repay the outstanding balance on the mortgage. In addition,
there may be federal income taxes due. Let t be the time of sale of the
project, SP the total cash sales price, and Kt the repayment of the out-
standing balance of principal on the permanent mortgage at the time of
the sale. Then, the pre-federal income tax cash realized at the sale,
SC, is
(34) SC = SP - Kt
The computation of the federal tax due on the sale of depreciated
property is complicated somewhat by the "recapture" provisions. Before
presenting the algebra, an explanation may be helpful. In general, when
a capital asset is sold at a gain, the resulting income is taxed as
capital gain income. The gain is computed as the difference between the
sales price and the adjusted basis of the property. The adjusted basis
at the time of sale is the original tax basis for depreciation purposes
less the accumulated tax depreciation taken over the life of the asset.
In the case of property that has been depreciated using an accelerated
method, some of the gain from the sale may be taxed as ordinary income.
Basically, the federal government taxes as ordinary income some of the
difference between the actual adjusted basis (using an accelerated de-
preciation method) and the adjusted basis had straight line depreciation
been used. The amount of this difference that is taxed as ordinary income
is called the applicable percentage, and varies (decreases) as the project
gets older. The intention of the recapture provisions is to prevent the
tax conversion of ordinary income into capital gains; i.e., the taking
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of deductions for depreciation against ordinary income and then the
payment of tax on the sale (when it turns out that the asset has not in
fact depreciated in real terms) at capital gains rates.
Let B acc be the adjusted basis at time t using accelerated de-
t
preciation, Bsl be the adjusted basis at time t using straight linet
depreciation. Then, the taxable income on the sale of a capital asset
not using accelerated depreciation is, using the notation for taxable
income from above,
(35) F = SP - B - L
t t
Note that since land is not a depreciable capital asset, it is included
in the adjusted basis at the time of the sale at its original purchase
price.
In the case of accelerated depreciated property, it is perhaps
simplest to think of the total tax due as capital gains tax on the dif-
ference between the actual adjusted basis and the sales price, plus a
recapture premium bringing up to ordinary income tax rates some portion
of the gain.
Let Fcg = the gain subject to capital gains treatment. Then
t
(36) Fcg =SP - Bacc - Lt t
Let Frcp = the gain subject to the premium bringing it up to full
t
ordinary income taxation. Then
Frep =(p)~ sl acc(37) F = (app)[B - B ]t t t
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where app is the applicable percentage, and is determined with respect
to the life of the building (as specified in the appendix).
Recalling that Gt is the federal tax due at t, and that ge is the
marginal tax rate of the equity holders, and assuming that capital gains
are taxed at half the rate as is ordinary income,
(38) G = (g /2)[Fcg] + (g - g /2)[F rcp
t e t e ge t
= (g /2)[SP - Bacc - + app(B sl acc
e t t Bt
The after tax cash flow from the sale is therefore, say S,
(39) S = SC - Gt
= SP(l - g /2)
-K
t
+ [Bacc + L - app(Bsl - Bacc) ] d/2)
From the appendix,
K = PV. [k(R'(1 - T) - E')][1 - (SW. )/(SW )]
t i ,n i ,t i ,n
p p p
t-l
where SWi t (1 + i)x
x=0
B =B(l - t/N)
t
Bacc = B(l - q/N)t
t
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What's most important from this discussion can be best seen by
presenting a rough graph indicating the amount of taxable income that
results from selling the building at different points in time. From
the basic construction of a level payment mortgage, the outstanding
balance on the loan falls very slowly at the start, accelerating over
the life of the loan. On the other hand, the depreciable basis falls
very quickly at the start, leveling out in later years. If we assume
that the equity in the project is given away, i.e., the project is sold
at the outstanding balance on the mortgage, there will still be a sub-
stantial tax due on the sale. In other words, during perhaps the first
half of the life of a project there may be a significant tax disincentive
to selling.
On the other hand, there can come a time when the project produces
taxable income in the absence of cash flow even if it is not sold. To
see this, imagine a situation where the cash income of the project covers
the operating expenses, the real estate taxes, and the debt service. In
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other words, assume no net cash flow to the equity. During as much as
the last half of the life of the project, the deduction for depreciation
will be exceeded by the imputed taxable income resulting from the re-
payment of principal (i.e., a cash outflow that is not deductible.) In
such a case, it may be advantageous for the owners of the project to sell
the project and pay a one time capital gains tax rather than continuing
to pay out cash. This case often occurs in the projections of limited
dividend housing developments, where the cash flow to equity is regulated
to be so low. These projections often assume that the project will be
given away after twenty or twenty-five years, just to avoid such a
situation.
Clearly, there are a great range of plausible assumptions that could
be made about the disposition of the development after this many years.
If cash flow does in fact continue to grow, then refinancing, to increase
the tax advantages of leverage, may make the most sense. If cash flow is
shrinking, then an early bail out may be right. The best course of action
in the future will obviously depend on the actual outcome at the point of
decision, and the revised expectations about the remainder of the economic
life of the project as a result of those outcomes. In each case, the
decision that has to be made is how to maximize the federal tax subsidy
to the project, or minimize the present value of the taxes due.
Rather than assuming a specific disposition strategy, this work
will assume that the project is held until the end of its economic life--
to the point where the building can no longer be expected to produce posi-
tive cash flow. Were it not for federal taxes, this would be equivalent
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to computing the value of the shares of a firm as the present value of
all future dividends. There are several points to be made about this
approach. First, it is the most conservative. At each future point in
time, the owners of the development have their choice between keeping
the development under their ownership, or selling it. The only reason
they would sell is if the price offered exceeded the present value of the
cash flows expected. Therefore, standing at this point in time, we would
expect some disposition prior to the end of the economic life to indicate
that value of the project was maximized, and exceeded the value of holding
out to the end. Second, while this is the most conservative assumption,
there is great forgiveness of it since the present value of anything thirty
years from now is so small. Any increase in value as computed today re-
sulting from the disposition or refinancing that far out in the future can
not be expected to make a substantial contribution. Third, in reality,
the disposition value of the project in the far future will likely reflect
the redevelopment value of the land under the development. Clearly this
potential land value must be exogenous to this model. The real uncertainty
about the residual value of the land goes together with the uncertainty as
to when another redevelopment of the land will become feasible. In short,
the difficulty and the lack of return involved in making any reasonable
assumption about the disposition value leads to two very simple propositions.
The development will be assumed to stay under single ownership for the full
economic life. The value of the land underneath the project will be. assumed
to grow at the same rate as do other prices, to roughly reflect the impact
of inflation on the residual value. The sale of the land at that point
will be presumed to result in capital gains. The after-tax cash flow at
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the end of the economic life is S,
(40) S = (L)[(1 + z e) t][1 - ge/2] + (L)(ge/2)
4.9 Present Value of Cash Flows
The net present value of the equity is then the discounted value of the
Yt's plus the discounted value of the final disposition of the project.
The appendix computes the discounted value of each component of cash
flow identified in the summary above, based on a flat term structure.
To simplify things, the following notation will be used:
t
RW. = [11/(1 + i) ]
:L,t
x=1
= the present value of one dollar per period
from x=1 to x=t, discounted at i per period
t-1
SWi~t = (1 + i)X
x=O
= the future value of one dollar per period
from x=0 to x=t-1, discounted at i
PW. = 1/(1 + i)t
i,t
= the present value of one dollar after t periods
QWit = [x/(l + i)X]
x=1
= the present value of one dollar at period one,
two dollars at period two, etc., discounted
at i per period
The interest rate i will be used in each of the expressions below,
and should be understood to represent the appropriate discount rate,
which will be specified in the following section.
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Capital Expenditures
Land Acquisition
PV = (L)[PW. L]
Construction Expenditures
PV = [(A-L)/(td-tc)][RWitd-tc][PWi~tc]
Operating Income
Rent up Revenues
PV = [R'/(t'-t")][QW ,1 t 1 ]{PW. 3,]
Continuing Rents
i-z
PV = (R')[RW ,][PW. , zn = +z
z .,t-t i,tri 1+
r,i' r
Development Expenses
PV = (E0){RW. , ]
Rent up Expenses
PV = (E")[RW ttt,][PW.tu,]
+ [(E'-E")/(t'-t")][QW. , ,,]-t"[PW. ]
Continuing Expenses
PV = (E'){RW ,][PW. ,]
z .,t-t i,t
Private Debt Advances
Construction Loan Advances
To Cover Land Acquisition
PV = [m(L)][PW iL]
To Cover Capital Construction Advances
PV = [m(A-L)(t dt c)][RW itd-tc][PWitc]
i-z
e
ze. =
e, 1 1+z
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Interest on Land Acquisition
PV = [m(L)i c][RWi . ][PW L] i.= c
'ci,t*-tL i,t ci 1+iC
c
Interest on Construction Advances
PV = [m(A-L)/(t -t c)][(RWi .td-t c)-(RW itd-tc)](PWitc)
ci
+[m(A-L)/(t dtc)][(1 + ic tdtc-1][RW ]
- [PW. d][1 + ic]
Permanent Loan Advance
PV = [k (R'(1-T)-E')][RW ][PWi t*
Repayment of Private debt
Construction Loan
PV = [m(L)(1 + ic t*t+1]PWi,t*
+ [m(A-L)/(td-tc)][(l + ic t*-tc-(1 + i t*-td
-[(1 + i ) 2I ][PW. *]
c c i,t*
Permanent Loan
PV = [k(R'(1-T)-E')][RW .t-t* [PWit*]
Public Capital Contributions
PV = [U(L)][PW. L]
i,t
+ [if(A-L)/(tdtc)][RWit-tc][PWitc]
Local Taxes
PV = [T(R')/(t-t")][QWi,t i,t"
+ [T(R')][RWzr,it-t ]Pi ,
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Interest on Long Term Debt
PV = [k(R'(l-T)-E')][RW. ]{PW. *]iL,n 1, t
p
-[(RW. )/(RW. ) - (RW. )/[(l + i )(SW. )]]
p p1 p
Depreciation
PV = [A(1-II)-L][(q/N)/(1-q/N)][RWQdt-td][PWi]td]
= i + q/N
1 - q/N
Sale
PV = [(L)[(l + z )t (1 - ge/2) + ge/2]][PWi,t
Note that in the preceding equations, t represents the specific time of
sale or other disposition of the project.
Inspection of each of the terms in the private feasibility equation
indicates that the public policy variables, U and T, appear only in
linear fashion. After substitution for the variables in the architectural,
financial, and federal tax programs, and equating the PVE to zero, the
private feasibility constraint will reduce to a simple linear relationship
between U and T of the following form,
(41) U = x (T) + x2
This simple linear relationship can then be substituted back into the
expressions for the net present value of Ut and Tt given in the summary
above, and discounted at the appropriate rate for such public investment
to arrive at the Residual Market Value (RMV) as defined above.
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CHAPTER 5
FINANCIAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR VALUATION OF
CASH FLOWS FROM NEW DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Valuation of Uncertain Cash Flows
The work in the previous section did not specify the appropriate
interest rate to be used to discount each of the components in the cash
flow equation (Eq. (7)). Clearly, in a riskless world, all flows would
be discounted at the same riskless rate. But in an uncertain world, the
present value of a stream of cash flows depends on some assessment of
the associated risk. There are several basic approaches to dealing with
uncertainty in capital budgeting, including the use of risk adjusted
discount rates, certainty equivalents to future cash flows, probabilistic
computations with or without utility adjustments, or outcome simulation.
A comprehensive analysis of the alternative mechanisms for dealing with
uncertainty in capital budgeting is clearly beyond the scope of this
thesis. We will assume here that the risk associated with the project
cash flows will be reflected through the discount rates used. Without
attempting to make a strong theoretical defense of this assumption, there
are several points to be made on its behalf. Most importantly, this is
the technique most widely used in the real estate industry. The use of
risk adjusted discount rates in the valuation of real estate projects
(as well as specific claims on projects) is generally accepted by real
estate traders. The sale of equity claims on real estate projects
(particularly when widely distributed) is usually predicated on a
valuation arrived at by discounting pro forma after tax cash flows at
a risk adjusted interest rate.1 What's important about the fact that
the use of risk adjusted rates is common in the marketplace is not that
it implies any theoretical superiority, but that it provides at least
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a limited source of information about the expected returns on this type
of risky asset.
The use of the discount rate to reflect the risk of expected cash
flows is also attractive because of the consistency with the Capital
Asset Pricing Model. Again, this is not the place for an evaluation of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which is available elsewhere.2
Briefly, the CAPM relates the required (expected) return on an asset to
its systematic risk, or non-diversifiable risk. The essence of the
equilibrium model is presented in the equation of the risk-return re-
lationship. In its usual form, the expected return on asset i in a
single period, E[R ] will satisfy
E[R.] = R + b (E[R ] - R )i f i mn f
where R is the return on the portfolio of all assets available at
m
equilibrium in the market, Rf is the return on the riskiness asset,
and b. is the market sensitivity of asset i, or the slope of the re-
gression line relating the return on asset i and the return on the market
portfolio. The CAPM defines the market sensitivity as
b. = cov(R,R )/var(R ).
What is important to note is that the CAPM results imply that the market
rewards the bearing of risk in linear relationship and that the risk that
is rewarded is the variability in returns that can not be difersified by
addition of other assets to the portfolio, not the variability of returns
with respect to the expectation for the asset itself. Although the CAPM
was originally derived for a one period situation, it has been extended
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to the multi-period, continuous time environment. Derivation of the
model in general depends on a standard set of perfect market assumptions.
The fundamental implication of the CAPM to capital budgeting is that
the expected return on a project should adequately compensate for its
systematic risk. Although most of the derivation and testing of the CAPM
was oriented towards securities markets, extension of the basic pro-
positions to individual projects was suggested by Myers. Bower and
Lessard also have presented an operational approach to risk screening
in the capital budgeting process that included comparison of expected
returns to the project's systematic risk.5 (This latter article also
points out the significant difficulty in deriving a theoretically sound
risk screening rule, and in estimating the systematic risk of a project.)
Even without assuming the CAPM, modern financial theory has recognized
the need to reflect the increased risk of equity claims on assets due to
the use of leverage. Again, without a rigorous defense, this work will
assume the basic propositions relating required returns on various claims
on an asset to the capital structure as advanced by Modigliani and Miller
(MM) For our purposes, the MM results can be summarized briefly: that
the total value of a leveraged enterprise is equal to the value of the
unleveraged enterprise plus the present value of the federal tax subsidy
resulting from the deductibility of interest payments. Although the
original MM work was in a no bankruptcy environment, Merton has shown
that the results hold in the case of potential bankruptcy also. Hamada
has substituted the MM results into the CAPM structure to indicate the
relationship between the capital structure of an enterprise and the
systematic risk of the different claims.8
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5.2 Structures of Discount Rates
With these assumptions in hand we can now return to Eq. (8) and
indicate the appropriate type of discount rate to be used in valuation
of each component of the after tax cash flows. Repeating Eq. (8),
PVE = PV[O - A ] + PVS]
t t
+ PV[Mt 
- Kt
+ PV[Ut - Tt
- PV[g(t t- - Tt - D t
Remember that the first line of the equation represents the net value of
the unleveraged, untaxed project cash flows. The second line represents
the net value of the cash flows to and from the source of private financing.
The third line represents the net value of the cash flows claimed by the
local government, and the last line the net value of the cash flows claimed
by the federal government. Also remember that the cash flows are to be
valued from the point of financial view of the equity investors.
In the context of the CAPM, the first line of the equation should
be discounted at that rate appropriate to the degree of systematic risk
associated with an unleveraged project of this type. Note carefully that
these unleveraged and untaxed cash flows are not to be discounted at the
required return for equity on the leveraged investment. In the MM context,
the unleveraged cash flows should be discounted at the rate appropriate
for the unleveraged investment.
From MM, the net value to the equity position from the use of private
market debt is zero, i.e.,
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PV[Mt - K t = 0
in the equation for the net value of the equity.
To select discount rates for line three, we must restate the de-
finitions of the local government's claim on the project in terms of the
uncertain variables. Using the notation x to indicate a stochastic
variable, the cash flows to the local government are:
Public Capital Contribution - U
t
Ut = U(At
Local Taxes 
- Tt
Tt = T(R )
ft t
Clearly, the cash flows to the local government are perfectly correlated
with some component of the project's pre-tax, pre-financing cash flows.
Although the required payments to the local government do not constitute
a direct partnership interest in the pre-financing, pre-tax cash flows
(only because the local government does not contribute proportionately
to the actual project operating expenses), these payments will have
systematic risk quite similar to that of the unleveraged project itself.
We will therefore use the same discount rate to compute the net present
value of the payments appropriated by the local government (the value
as perceived by the equity holders that forego that cash income) as is
used to discount the tax free pre-financing cash flows.
To the extent that federal tax laws remain unchanged and investors'
marginal tax rates stay constant, the cash flows claimed by the federal
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government are also linked directly to the underlying cash flows of the
project. There are two components to the federal government's claims.
The first component is a share of the after local tax operating income,
O -T . Again, from the equity's perspective, the required payment to the
t t
federal government is correlated with this net cash flow which is the
difference, as assumed above, between two flows with similar systematic
risk. It will therefore be assumed that this component of the payments
to the federal government will be discounted at the same rate. On the
other hand, the federal tax bill will be reduced by deductions for in-
terest accrued and depreciation taken. Both these deductions follow
fixed patterns over time as indicated in the previous section. As long
as the project does not go bankrupt, the actual deduction in each period
will be equal to the expected deduction. From the private mortgage
interest rate, it is clear how the private debt market has valued the
interest payments. From the MM assumption, we know that the equity
holders place the same value (exclusive of taxes) on these transfer
payments to the private debt holders. We will therefore assume that
the equity holder values the prospective deductions for interest pay-
ments at the "quasi-riskless" rate: the private debt rate. Note that
in the MM environment the value of fixed debt payments decreases
(relative to the payment) as the use of debt increases. This will
also be true of the valuation of the tax deduction for interest payments.
This basically reflects the fact that increased leverage increases the
probability of bankruptcy (that the value of the project will fall below
the outstanding balance of the market debt). As the probability of
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bankruptcy increases, so does the probability that the benefits from the
tax deductions will not accrue to the equity, i.e., those deductions
from years after the bankruptcy will not be available. Therefore it
seems appropriate to use a higher discount rate to compute the value
of the interest deductions as leverage increases. Which is the result
implied in using the private market rate of interest as a discount rate.
The same reasoning implies the use of the market interest rate to
compute the present value of the depreciation deductions, which is a
similarly riskless set of cash flows in the absence of bankruptcy.
We can now summarize these assumptions by rewriting Eq. (8),
PVE = PVk[Ot - At + S]
+ PVk[Ut - Tt]
- PVk e (Ot - T t]
+ PV.[g (I + D )]Se t t
where
k = the required return on tax free cash flows
on the unleveraged project.
i = the required return on the debt of the
leveraged project.
[For a more detailed discussion of the issues in selecting multiple
discount rates in capital budgeting, the reader is referred to the
literature on lease financing. The strong effects that the federal
tax structure has on off-balance-sheet financing as opposed to owner-
ship is a central topic of that literature, which deals with an
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essentially analogous set of financial issues. For a summary see
Bower. 9]
5.3 Social Cost of Capital
We turn now to the social cost of capital. We have indicated above
that the private sector values the cash flows paid over and received
from the local government at the project's unleveraged overall discount
rate, k. We must now determine the appropriate discount rate for the
local government to use in computing the RMV of these cash flows. There
is a broad literature supporting several alternative attitudes about the
appropriate rate to use in discounting future public benefits from
publicly supported projects. Most of that literature views the problem
from the perspective of the federal government, and was in fact written
with evaluation of federal programs in mind. 10 Basically, all authors
agree that the appropriate way to determine the social discount rate is
with respect to the opportunity cost (i.e., foregone return elsewhere)
of capital invested in the project. This is consistent with the funda-
mentals of cost-benefit analysis outlined in the introduction, and views
capital as an input into the project like any other. Unfortunately,
opinions diverge when it comes to identifying the right opportunity
cost, primarily because of the great variety of returns available on
different assets in the marketplace. Particular attention has been
focussed, of course, on the relevance of risk to the opportunity cost
of social capital. Some authors have tended to view risk as irrelevant.
Arrow, for example, operates on an assumption that individual projects
do not have significant systematic risk, and that the federal government
acts as a complete diversifying intermediary of risk, which therefore
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is irrelevant to the analysis of federal projects. Other authors do
admit risk aversion as a social cost on the federal level.12 Clearly,
the CAPM framework implies directly the relevance of risk to the op-
portunity cost of capital. In restated form, the CAPM relates expected
return on capital to the marginal contribution that the particular asset
makes to the non-diversifyable total risk to be borne by society. To
maintain efficiency, social investment must receive the required return
for the creation of this marginal risk.
In any case, the above alternative attitudes do not address them-
selves to the problem as perceived by local government. Local government
must take a local, not global, view of the world. In the first place,
local government just does not have the capacity to aggregate risks to
the point of irrelevance (presuming even that there is not systematic
risk to projects). And second, it is not clear that it is appropriate
for local governments to make decisions not in the best interests of
the local citizenry, even if it is in the national interest; nor is it
clear that any local government will make such a decision. Simply,
local government may not find much solace in the proposition that risk
is irrelevant on a national scale (as proposed by some) if it is
assuming substantial risk on behalf of local citizens.
We will here take a stronger position: that under the CAPM the
local government must view the opportunity cost of investment on behalf
of its constituents as the foregone return on an investment with equi-
valent systematic risk. Basically, this point of view assumes that the
capital markets are reasonably perfect; that the imperfection that en-
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couraged governmental action on the project was not in the capital market.
Put another way, we are assuming that the market place has priced risk
correctly, and that risk bearing must be purchased like any other input.
In this case, the local government is intermediating investment on behalf
of the local population, which holds the residual claim on the "value of
the city"--the net of services provide the shareholders and the taxes paid.
In maximizing local residents' welfare, the local government must simply
insure that the marginal risk that they are asked to bear as a result of
governmental intervention is compensated for by an adequate expected
return.
The implication of this assumption is that the local government
should use the same discount rate to compute the value of its claims on
the project as does the private market to compute the value of the pay-
ments, i.e., at discount rate k.
To summarize this section, presuming stability of rates over time
(i.e., a flat term structure) there are two relevant rates for valuation
of the equity, debt, and local government claims on the development
project:
k = the required return on federal tax free cash
flows of the unleveraged project overall
i = the required return on the debt of the
leveraged project.
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CHAPTER 6
VALUE OF TAX REVENUES FROM PARCELS NOT REDEVELOPED
In addition to the tax revenues from new development, the local
government will receive continued tax revenues from land parcels not
redeveloped. Even in the case of a total redevelopment, which will be
staged over time, the city will receive tax revenues from existing land
uses prior to their actual demolition for redevelopment. To compute
the full Residual Market Value, the present value of the tax revenues
to be received from land not redeveloped must be included, and the present
value of tax revenues from existing uses prior to redevelopment must be
included. There are several interesting problems involved in estimating
the present value of these cash flows. Although the actual cash flows
from the current period are a matter of public record (at the assessor's
office), there is no long term contract between the city and property
owner to specify the pattern of future cash flows. The uncertainty as
to future cash flow comes from two sources: the uncertainty as to the
future property tax rate, and the uncertainty as to the future assessed
value of the property. This latter uncertainty is particularly trouble-
some because of the heavy impact that redevelopment of some parcels may
have on the value of the others.
The BRA estimates the current market value of all the land in the
Park Plaza project area under its current use at roughly $18,000,000,
or about two thirds of the expected acquisition cost. The current
assessed valuation is about half the market value, or one third of the
expected acquisition cost, or roughly $9,000,000. The current tax rate
in Boston is about $200 per year per $1000 of assessed value. The
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current annual tax bill is therefore 10% of market value, or 6.6% of
the acquisition price.1
The city can clearly increase the future tax rate as required to
support city services. Tax rates in the city have increased on a nominal
basis consistently, to a great degree to cover inflation in the cost of
city services. Future tax rate increases would reflect not only the
changing price level but any policy decision to change the level of city
services. A comprehensive analysis of the expected pattern of future
tax rates is beyond the scope of this work.2 We will assume here that
future tax rates are based on a fixed level of services, and therefore
increasing to reflect inflation. On the other hand, under the current
administration of the local property tax, it should not be expected that
a specific property would be reassessed at any higher value over time.
This reflects the presumption that parcels that are not redeveloped now
will be kept under their current use over the life of the new project.
The result is the expectation that the property tax bill for each property
will grow over time at the same rate that the price level is changing. Or,
that property taxes are constant in real dollars over time.
We will also assume that the proportionality of tax bill to taxable
assessment to purchase price to market value holds over the entire site,
i.e., for each individual parcel. Then, using the above notation, the
present value of the tax revenues from any parcel prior to its taking
for redevelopment can be expressed as:
PV = (L)(6.6%)(RW zLtL)
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where
zL = (i - z )/(l + ze)
i = the discount rate used on future tax revenues
z = the expected rate of inflation
Note that for parcels not acquired, tL will be the end of the economic
life of the project.
It is important to note the difference between the type of claim
that the local government has on new development and the type of claim
that it has on existing parcels that will not be redeveloped. As pointed
out, the local government's claim on new development closely resembles a
partnership equity interest. On the other hand, the contract with holders
of un-redeveloped properties gives the local government the most senior
debt position--the local government has a claim on nearly riskless flows.
As a result, the appropriate rate for valuation of the tax revenues must
be below the interest rate on market debt. In MM terms, the first dollar
of debt advanced on a project should expect to earn the riskless return.
From the market point of view, the local government is a financial
intermediary whose project's (assets) primarily include senior claims on
the local real estate. Municipal general obligation bonds are marketable
claims on the city's claims on the local real property. The required return
on general obligation municipal bonds reflects both the degree of "public
leverage" (the amount of debt in the city's capital structure), and the
systematic risk associated with future value of the city's real property
assets. In a market context, the value of the municipality's liabilities
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directly reflects the value of its assets. If we assume for the moment
homogeneity of the assets, both with respect to systematic risk, and with
respect to project leverage (the ratio of the value of the property to
the value of the municipal claim on it), then the required return on
municipal general obligation bonds would be the same as the expected
return on the city's claims on the real property.
In the Boston metropolitan area, cities rely on the property tax
for about 65% of their total revenue.3 Only a marginal amount of this
revenue comes from the relatively new use of Section 121 tax agreements.
The rest comes from the city's priority claim on the value of the property.
Another 24% of the area's cities' revenue comes from transfers from the
state or federal government. Clearly, then, a substantial portion of the
local government's long term assets consists of claims identical to the
claim that the local government holds on the value of the un-redeveloped
portions of this project. Since the property tax, in conventional form,
is roughly a proportionate tax on the value of the property, it is fair
to assume that the public local debt is secured by a similar portion of
the value of each parcel of land in the city. We will further assume that
the systematic risk associated with the future value of property that
remains un-redeveloped within the project area is similar to the systematic
risk of real property assets throughout the city. In an intuitive sense
this is equivalent to the proposition that the uncertainty about the future
value of real property that is site specific can be diversified away,
while the uncertainty that is city wide can only partially be diversified.
For example, the risk that the value of property in the central city will
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fall with a migration of economic activity to the suburbs can clearly be
diversified by the construction of a portfolio containing both urban and
suburban property. On the other hand, the uncertainty about future values
as a function of their relationship to the general performance of the
economy, may not be diversifiable by including other parcels in the city
into a portfolio.
We will therefore assume that future tax revenues to be collected
by the city from parcels not redeveloped should be discounted at the
city's general obligation bond long term interest rate, (ib).
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY OF MODEL TO COMPUTE RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
Using the expressions generated in the previous chapters, we
now summarize the entire model, and derive an explicit expression
for the Residual Market Value of a development alternative. From
Chapter 5, the value of the equity claims on new development is
(1) PVE = PVk[Ot At + S]
+ PV k[Ut - Tt
- PV ge(Ot 
- T t
+ PV [g e(It + Dt
From the work in Chapter 4, we can make a substitution into
Eq. (1) of an explicit expression for the present value of each
component of the cash flow to equity. These expressions appear in
the summary to Chapter 4. A quick review of that summary should
indicate that direct substitution of those expressions into Eq. (1)
would yield a result most difficult to work with. In order to
facilitate further manipulation of Eq. (1), the expressions from
Chapter 4 will be used in a more simplified form.
7.1 Short Form Statement of Present Value of Cash
Flow Components
Each of the expressions for the present value of a component
of the cash flow can be organized as a separable function of two
sets of variables:
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1. Those variables that represent the basic market prices of
inputs and outputs (other than capital.) This includes
the price of land, capital construction costs, rental in-
come, and the cost of development and operating expenses
[L, A, R', E', E", E0 ].
2. The costs of capital, the changes in price level, the
financial program, and the t's that describe the develop-
ment schedule. Most of these variables are not simply
separable in the present value expressions. In fact, most
of these variables are soundly consolidated as arguments
for the PW, RW, QW, and SW operators.
In order to write a usable expression for RMV in terms of the
six commodity market prices, we will work in terms of a single
function of all the variables in group two. For example, from
Chapter 4, the present value of the rental income after substantial
occupancy is
(2) PV = R'[RWZ . ,t-tt][PW.,gt]
r
In this section we will substitute and rewrite Eq. (2) as
(3) PV = R'[F(CR)]
F(CR) = [RWzr, ,ttt][PWit ]
In each case, the present value of a component of cash can be
expressed as the product of a "Basic Market Price" (Group 1 Variable)
and a "financial Factor," (Function of Group 2 Variables).
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The financial factors convert the basic market prices directly
into present values. Using the example above, the present value of
the rental income after substantial occupancy is directly proportion-
ate to the expected rental income at substantial occupancy. The
financial factor simply indicates the present value of that flow per
dollar of rental income.
We therefore make the following substitutions in the present
value expressions:
Operating Income 
- t
Rent-up Revenues (RR)
PV = [R'/t'-t"][QWkt-t' f[PWk, t"
= R'[F(RR)]
Continuing Rents (CR)
PV = (R')[RW ,]
z t-t
rk,
= R'[F(CR)]
Development Expenses (DE)
PV = (E0 )RWkt'
= E [F(DE)]
Rent-up Expenses (RE)
PV = E"[RWkt-t ][Pwk,t] + [(E'-E")/(t'=t")][QWkt,tt"[PWk,t"l
= E"[F(RE)] + E'[F(RR)]
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Continuing Expenses (CE)
PV = E'[RWzek, t-t k,t'
= E'[F(CE)]
Capital Expenditures 
- At
Land Acquisition (LA)
PV = L[PWktL]
= L[F(LA)]
Construction Expenditures (CX)
PV = [(A-L)/(td-t c)][RWktd-tc][PWktcl
- (A-L) [P (CX) ]
Sale - S
Final Disposition (FD)
PV = L[(l+z )t (1-g /2) + g /2 ][PWt]
= L[F(FD)]
On Construction Advances (IC)
PV = (A-L)[m/(t d-t c)][PWktc][(t 
-t c-RWi,td-tc)
+((1+icd tdtc- 1)d(+ic)(t*-td
= (A-L)[F(IC)]
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On Permanent Mortgage (IP)
PV = [R'(1-T)-E'](k)[RWi n] [PWk,t*][1-n/(1+ip)[SW n]]
= [R' (1-T)-E' ][F(IP)]
Depreciation 
- Dt
PV = [A(1-J)-L][(q/N)/(1-q/N)][RW QN ktd
= [A(1-U)-L][F(DP)]
7.2 Summary Statement of PVE
Restating Eq. (1) using these substitutions:
PVE = R'[F(RR) + F(CR)][1-g e]
-[E 0 [F(DE)] + E"[F(RE)]][1-g ]
-E'[F(RR) + F(CE)][1-g ]
- L[F(LA)] - (A-L) [F (CX)]
+ L [F(FD)]
+ U[L [F (LA)] - (A-L) [ F (CX)]]
- T[R'][F(RR) + F(CR)][1-g ]
+ g [L[F(IL)] + (A-L)[F(IC)]
+ g [R'(1-f) - E'][F(IP)]
+ g e[A'(1-U) - L][F(DP)]
Rearranging in terms of the basic market prices:
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(5) PVE = R'[[F(RR) + F(CR)](1-g ) + [F(IP)]g ]
- E'[[F(RR) + F(CE)](1-g ) + [F(IP)]g ]
- E0 [F(DE)](1-g )
- E"[F(RE)](1-g )
-L [F(LA) - F(FD) - F(IL)(g )]
-(A-L)[F(CX) - [F(IC) - F(DP)]g ]
+ U[L[F(LA)] + (A-L)[F(CX)] - A[F(DP)]g ]
- T[R'][[F(RR) + F(CR)](1-g ) + [F(IP)]g ]
The first six lines of Eq. (5) present the value of the equity
if there were no local governmental claims on (or contributions to)
the project. The last two lines present the net value to the equity
(after federal tax) of those local public claims. Call the value of
equity prior to local government claims the Net Market Value (NMV).
Then
(6) PVE = NMV
+ U[L[F(LA)] + (A-L)[F(CX)]-A[F(DP)]g ]
- T[R'][[F(RR) + F(RR)](1-ge) + F(IP)g ]
By setting the PVE to zero, Eq. (6) yields the feasible combinations
of U and T.
T[R'][[F(RR) + F(CR)](1-ge) + F(IP)g] - NMV
(7) U L[F(LA) - F(CX)] + A[F(CX) 
- F(DP)g ]
While Eq. (7) specifies the relationship between feasible com-
binations of U and T, the actual values for either U or T must be
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determined outside of the model. Chapter 10 deals with the selection
of the combination of U and T. That chapter will show that RMV is
an increasing function of both U and T. Therefore RMV can be maximized
(by the selection of U and Y) to the extent that neither of these two
variables is unconstrained from above. The appropriate combination is
then determined by the upper limit constraints put on U and T. Chapter
10 will specify these limits on the variables that determine the local
* *
government's claims on the project. Let U and T be the feasible
combination satisfying Eq. (7) as determined in Chapter 10.
7.3 Summary Statement of RMV
By definition, the Residual Market Value (of new development) is
the present value of the cash flow to the local government. From
Chapter 3,
*
(8) RMV = T [PVk [Rt]]
*
- U [PV k [At
From Chapter 4, and the substitutions above,
*
(9) RMV = T [R'][F(RR) + F(CR)]
*
- U [L[F(LA)] + (A-L)[F(CX)]]
where the first line is the present value of the tax revenues, and the
second line is the present value of public capital contributions.
By adding Eq. (9) to Eq. (6), with PVE = 0, we get alternative
definition for RMV.
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(10) RMV = NMV
*
+ T [R'][g ][F(RR) + F(CR) - F(IP)]
*
- U [A][g ][F(DP)]
Eq. (10) indicates that RMV is equal to the net market value of
the equity were there no local public claims, plus the federal tax
subsidy rewarding the use of the local government as a source of
finance for the project. The second line of Eq. (10) represents the
tax savings resulting from the deduction of local taxes, less the
reduction in deductions for interest on long term debt. [The greater
the amount of "local government financing" the lower the amount of
market debt supportable.] The third line represents the present value
of tax savings lost because of reduced depreciation deductions re-
flecting the reduced basis as the local government provides a greater
portion of the capital costs.
This thesis will compute the RMV of each development alternative
by evaluating Eq. (10) using data specified in the next section.
To complete computation of RMV, the value of revenues from
parcels not redeveloped must be added. From Chapter 6, for unre-
developed parcels
RMV = (L)(6.6%)(RWzL, tL)
Total RMV is the sum of RMV from new development and unredeveloped
parcels.
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CHAPTER 8
SPECIFICATION OF THE ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM
This section reviews the assumption and methods underlying the BRA
data. As noted in the introduction, this thesis will work in the context
of the BRA data. Primarily, the BRA data will be used to specify the
architectural program. The detailed specification of the data defining
each of the development alternatives will be presented in Appendix II.
The review of the BRA data will include a summary of the assumptions and
a critique indicating where the BRA approach may be weak.
8.1 Source of Data
The data required to specify the architectural program will come
primarily from three BRA documents: Park Plaza: Urban Design Objectives,
Financial and Market Feasibility1 (January 9, 1975); Park Plaza: Defining
the Alternatives (February 4, 1975); and Park Plaza: Development Staging
Plan (March, 1975). Each of these documents has been prepared with
substantial judgment by the BRA staff. The first represents a summary
of the market and economic data that is regularly collected by the BRA
staff relative to the city's real estate markets. The underlying data
can be found in a number of other BRA publications, and other attempts
to apply the data to Park Plaza can be found in the analyses produced by
Gladstone Associates, Economic Consultants, for the Boston Urban Assoc-
iates.5 Note that the Gladstone market studies rely substantially on
original demographic, economic, and real estate market data produced
by either the BRA or the U.S. Census. The latter two documents represent
the BRA staff's efforts to construct reasonable development schemes
in terms of a development schedule. It is important to remember that the
mixture of uses represents the judgment of the BRA as to what would be
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optimal at each level of density, but does not represent either the
financially or architecturally optimal scheme. In other words, the
construction of the alternative schemes has already involved some sub-
jective weighting of the non-market inputs and outputs against the
market inputs and outputs; neither the market value or the non-market
public value of the development has been explicitely maximized.
The specification of the development alternatives in Appendix II
will be done in terms of development components. As defined above, a
development component is a separately constructed building element de-
voted to a primary space use. For example, an office building tower
would be a single development component. A single structure that con-
tains substantial portions of both office space and residential space
would be considered two development components. A development alter-
native that contained provision for office space in two different
structures to be built in two different construction phases would also
be considered to have two development components of offices.
For each development alternative, the Appendix II specifies:
The development components of which the scheme consists.
A Schematic site Plan of the Alternative.
For each component:
A = Total Capital Construction Cost
L = Total Land Cost Allocable
R'= Rental Income at Substantial Occupancy
E'= Operating Expense at Substantial Occupancy
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E" = Operating Expense at Initial Occupancy
E* = Development Expense Per Period
tL = Time of Land Purchase
t = Start of Construction
t = Substantial Completion of Construction
t" = Initial Occupancy
t' = Substantial Occupancy
8.2 Development Alternatives
The alternative schemes as created by the BRA are heavily motivated
by the BRA's urban design objectives. Fundamental to an understanding
of the BRA's approach is an understanding of the BRA's "parcelization,"
or subdivision, of the project area. From the January 9th report:
Although in the formulation of the urban renewal plan it
was stated that the project area must be treated as one
integrated building complex, it has always been under-
stood that development by necessity would occur incre-
mentally. Both financing practice and market limita-
tions call for a sequence of phased development actions
over several years. This study assumed that each of
these phases or parcels should be economically self-
sustaining. Consequently, parcels must be defined in
such a way that they are both small enough to insure a
successful development which is an independent economic
unit and still substantial enough to allow significant
improvements to achieve an attractive and marketable
environment. The individual parcels must also fit into
a properly conceived physical linkage with adjacent
parcels.6
As a result, the BRA identified three basic parcels. These parcels
have come to be known by their current use, and as identified on the map,
are:
Park Square Parcel
Eliot Street Garage Parcel
Statler Hilton Parcel
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It is most important to note the fact that the parcels each cut a north-
south band across the site. This is the result of a very deliberate
effort on the part of the BRA to package the high cost land along the
Boylston Street frontage of the site with the lower cost land along
Stuart Street in each of the parcels. [Note average land cost per square
foot of land on the map.]
The development alternatives then result by excluding certain parcels
from redevelopment. The six million square foot alternative (square
footages include both redeveloped space and space on parcels not re-
developed) requires redevelopment of all parcels. The five million
square foot alternative eliminates redevelopment of the Saxon Theatre
Sub-parcel. The four million square foot alternative additionally elim-
inates redevelopment of the Boylston Street Sub-parcel of the Statler
Hilton parcel. To get to the three and a half million square foot
alternative, another Boylston Street Sub-parcel is eliminated from re-
development. The three million square foot alternative is generated by
reducing the building heights on the same land as comprised the three
and a half million foot alternative. The two million square foot
alternative (which has been called the "no-build" program), requires
development on only now vacant sites.
In addition, the BRA set out other physical design objectives.
Each of the parcels was to have only one high-rise tower. In order
to get the full six million square feet, that alternative required
two extra towers.
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Buildings with frontage on the major edge streets would be limited
in height to match the height of buildings along the street elsewhere.
Higher portions of the development would have to be set back from the
front of the development in most cases. The office tower at the corner
of Arlington and Boylston Streets in the large development schemes is
an exception to this rule.
To encourage pedestrian movement across the site from Boylston to
Stuart Streets, public open space was to be put at ground level in the
middle of the Park Square and Eliot Street Garage parcels.
Mixed uses should be included in the low continuous buildings that
make up the Boylston and Stuart Street frontages. The mixing of uses is
viewed as essential to keeping the development lively after office hours--
to keep residential, retail, and entertainment activities going. In
general, two levels of retail space are to be distributed across the
built portions of the site.
The parking for the development would be in low buildings along the
Stuart Street (least valuable) side of the site. Some schemes involve
the re-use of existing parking garages on that side of the site.
The allocation of space in the towers to different uses is held
relatively constant over the different development sixe alternatives.
As explained by the BRA,
a) Park Square Parcel - hotel tower (800 rooms). All
development programs to date have located a hotel tower
in this parcel. Marketing analysis shows there is a
strong demand for a hotel and this parcel is the most
immediately available of the three parcels (primarily
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due to the high proportion of cleared and City-owned
land.) Also, a hotel in this parcel can compliment the
adjacent Statler Hilton hotel by reinforcing the con-
ventional market, for example.
b) Eliot Street Garage Parcel - apartment tower (600
units). The advantages of locating apartment uses on
this parcel were discussed in Section I of the report
of January 9th, page 23. [linking residential areas
in downtown to the Common]. All the development
options shown here assume one major tower of 600
units (increased to 725 units by contiguous low
housing elements). One major tower, of course,
conforms with the urban design objective of dis-
tribution of bulk, but this many apartment units
may be difficult to market at one time. If so,
either the number will have to be reduced or a more
complicated distribution of apartments in several
buildings considered.
c) Statler-Hilton Parcel - office tower (800,000
sq. ft.) The contiguous area of the Back Bay fin-
ancial/insurance district determines the redevel-
opment of this parcel for office use.
d) As peripheral sub-parcels are not acquired, the
building area is reduced incrementally for each
successive alternative. As has been stated, with
the reduction in the pressure of land cost, a lesser
amount of new development is required. Development
cannot be reduced simply by decreasing the number of
floors or the size of a floor; however, a discrete
element of development = a tower, a complete low
rise element, etc., may be deleted. Deletion of
distinct elements is the simplest means to visualize
incremental reduction. This approach also takes
into account certain minimum sizes for practical
development packages, e.g., a housing tower of ten
apartments per floor and 15 stories high, etc. Be-
cause of the minimum space requirements for each
use, the development programs do not come out to
exact multiples of a million square feet.7
The development alternatives as generated by the BRA are generally
consistent with the urban design objectives.
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8.3 Market Analysis
The prices of marketable inputs and outputs from development are
primarily specified in Sections III and IV of the BRA's January 9th
Report.8 In general, the BRA tends to view the real estate market in
competitive terms; it first attempts to identify the total "potential"
demand for a particular real estate product, and then specifies the
competitive market price for that product. In the case of Park Plaza,
the BRA must abandon its conventional approach because it is clear that
if the development is going to succeed it will have to achieve rents
above those in the rest of the market. As indicated in the introduction,
one of the fundamental rationales for the major mixed use development
scheme is that such a mixed use environment would create value for each
type of space that it would not have standing alone. Unfortunately, the
BRA has developed little data to identify the amount of rent premium that
can be supported at Park Plaza. Clearly, the objective of a comprehensive
market analysis is to estimate the demand curve for project outputs, and
the supply curve for project inputs. The most important attribute of
such a curve is that it relates the price at which a commodity can be
bought or sold. It is obvious that from its very nature Park Plaza is
a development that appeals to only a limited segment of real estate pro-
duct consumers.
The ability of Park Plaza to realize rents substantially above
conventional projects depends directly on its competitive advantages
over the alternatives. Prospective tenants may find that the location
of Park Plaza is more attractive than other locations. They may find
that the Park Plaza design offers more amenities not available elsewhere.
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They may simply be attracted to the mixed use environment. The critical
question in each case is whether the advantages of Park Plaza can be
converted into a rent premium. Although the BRA has support data that
identifies the market price for the conventional competitive products,
it does not provide any analysis of achievable rent premiums.
On the other hand, the BRA has attempted to identify the "potential
demand" for space at Park Plaza. It will be better to demonstrate the
BRA's conception of potential demand by looking at how they use it than
to attempt a definition.
Office Market
The BRA uses a relatively simple formula to estimate the potential
demand for office space. The BRA computes potential demand as the pro-
duct of the increase in downtown office employment and the square footage
of office space required to accommodate each new employee. Over the
next 12 years, the BRA expects an increase in downtown office employment
of about 40,500 jobs. This increase is expected to be the result of
expansion of the local economy. They also expect that each new employee
will be accommodated with between 200 and 225 square feet of office
space, generating a potential demand of almost 8.5 million square feet
of new office space. It should be clear that this estimate depends on
the assumption that each of the new employees is accommodated with over
200 square feet of newly constructed office space.
Consider the relevance of this estimate to the potential demand for
Park Plaza office space. (Let us assume for the moment that we accept
the BRA projection of increased employment.) First, substantial
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portion of the growth in employment over the next ten years will accrue
to existing firms. To the extent that these firms can accommodate their
growth in their existing location, there will be no potential demand for
space at Park Plaza. Clearly, some of the growing firms will outgrow
their space and have to move, but others may have planned ahead at the
time of their last move to avoid having to move again. There has been
a termendous degree of activity in the Boston office market over the
last ten years. Many of the City's most dynamic and rapidly growing
firms have relocated in new Class A office space in that period. To
the extent that these firms have anticipated their growth over the next
ten years, increases in downtown employment will not be translated into
potential demand for new downtown office space.
To put this in historical perspective, the city of Boston experienced
a period of almost 30 years with virtually no office development activity
downtown. Many business firms found their downtown space to be adequate,
and managed to accommodate their internal growth within the existing supply.
After this long period with no development, there has been a period re-
presenting the most rapid pace of development, in the city's history. As
a result, almost two-thirds of all downtown office space is now either
newly developed Class A space or redeveloped Class B space. What is
suggested here is that many of the firms that have relocated into this
space may be content for the next thirty years.
Also consider the growth in employment that represents creation of
new firms, or that represents growth to firms engaged in those office
activities that cannot pay Class A space rents. Clearly, very little
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of this growth in employment will be translated into potential demand
for new space at Park Plaza.
On the other hand, there may be a number of older and successful
firms that are still in Class B and C space who will choose in the near
future to move up to Class A space. These firms may choose to make the
move even if they have no growth in employment. There may also be some
businessmen who would move their firm to Park Plaza just for the con-
venience of the location, or because they don't like to walk outside on
the way to work. Clearly, demand from these groups will not be reflected
in the BRA potential demand analysis that considers only growth in em-
ployment.
The BRA has failed to translate underlying economic trends into
potential demand for Park Plaza office space. The potential demand that
they claim exists does not reflect the space needs or rent paying capacity
of large segments of the space consuming market.
Housing Market
The BRA estimated that potential demand for downtown housing will
be between 12,000 and 23,000 units over the next ten years. The deri-
vation of these numbers does not appear in the January 9th BRA report,
but it does appear in the BRA working paper of 6/74, "Housing in Boston;
Background Analysis and Program Directions."9 The underlying assumption
of the BRA estimate is that demand for downtown housing will grow in direct
proportion to the growth in downtown office employment. The BRA estimated
that downtown office employment will grow at about 6,000 jobs a year, and
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that potential demand for downtown housing will grow at 20 to 40 percent
of that rate, or between 1,200 and 2,400 units per year. Also implicit
in this relationship is the assumption that demand for downtown housing
from those who do not work in the Central Business District (CBD) will
grow directly in proportion to demand for such housing from CBD workers.
This analysis suffers from the same difficulties as does the office
space demand study. Essentially, there is no defense of the proposition
that an increase in general level of downtown office employment will
translate into demand for the highest priced housing in the city. Most
downtown office workers cannot come near to affording the Park Plaza
housing at the currently anticipated rents. Of the projected annual
increase in downtown office employees, only a small percentage could even
choose to move to Park Plaza. Again, the fundamental flaw is the assumption
that the projected growth in employment is the actual source of the demand.
Many of the prospective tenants for Park Plaza are working downtown now,
and their decision to move downtown to live will be independent of the
BRA downtown employment projections. The BRA analysis gives no explicit
consideration to the severe income limitations on the potential market for
Park Plaza housing, and as such, gives no real estimate of the size of
that market.
Retail Market
The problem of the retail market analysis presented here is identical
to the problem of the other market studies. The potential demand as cal-
culated by the BRA assumes substantial growth in the real disposable
(spendable) income of Boston area residents and further assumes that some
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portion of the increased income will be spent in the downtown area. The
BRA study then assumes that new retail space will be built to enable
people to spend this additional money. Specifically, the study assumes
that one square foot of retail space will be built for each $130 increase
in disposable income spent downtown.
Clearly, a substantial portion of the increased income will accrue
to individuals who will never shop at Park Plaza, either because they
cannot afford the high prices of goods to be sold, or because the site
is not convenient. These people will spend their extra income at the same
places that they spent whatever money they had before. Other shoppers
would come to the site even if they don't have any increase in their in-
come, just because the site is nearby, or a pleasant place to visit, or
offers goods not available in other locations. The point is the same as
above: the success of retail space at Park Plaza depends on people changing
their shopping habits to include shopping at Park Plaza. People may have
more to spend, but if there is no reason to spend it at Park Plaza, the
retail development won't be successful. It is not helpful to simply
assume that increases in income can be converted to Park Plaza sales;
that is what the market study should demonstrate.
The BRA study attempts to analyze demand in terms of the increase
in income, but the actual source of demand for retail space are the
shopping preferences of the consumers. Analysis of the increase in
income provides very little information about Park Plaza'a ability to
make an impact on consumers' shopping decisions.
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The projection of potential demand in each of the markets considered
above depends to a great degree on underlying assumptions about the
course of the national and local economies. In general, the assumptions
on which the current estimates of potential demand are based all predict
substantial growth in downtown employment and an increase in personal
disposable income. While these assumptions may have been fair several
years ago, the BRA would do well to reexamine these estimates in light
of the economic events of the last year. Given the inflation in prices
over the first half of this decade, it is questionable whether real
disposable income will increase at all by 1980. Nor is it clear that
employment will continue to grow, given the current recession and reduced
population growth rates. Special attention should be given to the impact
of current economic events on the projections of downtown employment,
since the residential, retail, and office space potential demands are all
heavily dependent on this projection.
The BRA market studies reflect an underlying attitude that downtown
redevelopment in Boston will proceed over the next ten years in very
much the same way that it has gone over the last ten years. This at-
titude warrants serious re-evaluation.
In this context, it is difficult to have a great deal of confidence
in the BRA estimates of the achievable revenues from space in the project.
It seems clear, though, that the BRA is skeptical of its own data. Rather
than specifying expected revenues, the BRA has provided low, medium, and
high estimates of revenues, expenses, and capital costs. The low revenue
projections are equivalent to rents being achieved by competitive con-
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ventional developments at current prices. The high revenue projections
correspond to the BRA's estimates of achievable rents in the full scale
mixed use development (i.e., at six million square feet).
In an effort to verify its data, the BRA hired Economics Research
Associates (ERA) to review it. In a letter dated January 23, 1975, Mr.
Tom Martin of ERA stated:
In response to your letter of January 14, 1975, E.R.A. has
reviewed the financial and market analysis data prepared by the
B.R.A. Presented below is a brief evaluation of this project
as relates to financial and market analysis. It should be
understood that our findings are based on information provided
and our perceptions of financial and market conditions that
exist in the Boston area and statements pertaining to future
development proj.ections are relevant to the extent that one
can make projections without conducting a comprehensive cost
and market analysis. We assume that information provided by
the B.R.A. relates to present value and is not a projection
of future conditions.
FINANCIAL EVALUATION
Our review of figures prepared by the B.R.A. have been compared
to comparable types of construction in the Boston area. Cost
and revenue calculations for the re-use study of the Boston
Navy Shipyard study and conversations with knowledgeable per-
sons associated with development in Boston have been used to
support our findings.
Office Development
Construction costs and revenue figures appear to be basically
in line with present conditions.
Presently, construction costs of $40/square foot is an
average figure that is being used for new construction.
Therefore, the estimates presented by the B.R.A. are
not unrealistic.
It is difficult to accurately define the reality of the
"soft costs" prepared by the B.R.A., in that no back-up
details are provided; their estimates appear to be
realistic.
Total development costs are in line with present conditions.
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Average gross rent per square foot is equitable when
considering the following rent levels for new space:
One Beacon Street - $8.90-$10.75/sq. ft.
60 State Street - $11.00+/sq. ft.
Shawmut Building - $10.25-$11.25/sq. ft.
Present operating expenses in Boston office buildings
are estimated at approximately $2.10-$2.20/sq. ft.
(not including electric).
Real estate taxes presently appear to be realistic,
but are subject to revision based on 100% property
valuation guidelines and a possible 121A tax agree-
ment. Taxes at $2.50/sq. ft. are representative of
general office building figures.
Retail and Entertainment Development
"Hard" construction costs appear to be realistic.
Once again, "soft costs" are not broken out by the
B.R.A. Their total figures appear to be in conform-
ity with industry figures.
Gross rent and operating expenses are realistic in
terms of quality retail space in Boston.
The "high" estimates presented by the B.R.A. are most
realistic for future near-term market conditions and
do not relate accurately to present conditions.
Residential Development
For luxury high-rise housing units, "hard" construction
costs of $32-$35 per square foot are not unrealistic
($45,000-$50,000 per unit based on 1,400 sq. ft.).
Average annual rental income per unit between $6,000
and $7,200 is realistic ($500-$600/month) given present
market conditions.
A 3% vacancy allowance should be revised to 5% reflecting
the high rents that presently would be more difficult to
absorb in the market.
Operational expenses should be reviewed in greater depth.
It appears that operating expenses are low (17% of ad-
justed gross rent) for luxury housing. Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency, for example, uses a "rule of
thumb" of approximately $1,000-$1,150/unit (without
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taxes) in subsidized developments with one and two
bedrooms.
Financial Assumptions Supporting Feasibility
The methodology used by the B.R.A. to calculate a rate of
return for office and retail usage for Park Plaza appears
to be consistent with normal investment return procedures.
A review of the method used to calculate an 8.8% return for
housing warrants closer inspection. To arrive at a net
revenue before debt service figure of $6,000 would mean
average monthly rents in excess of $700 per month. This
rent level is not consistent with recommendations presented
by the housing market survey prepared for Park Plaza, pre-
sent and near term market conditions in the city of Boston
and might seriously affect the absorption rates of avail-
able units at Park Plaza.
Assuming that the net revenue before debt service was
$5,320 as determined in the "high" calculation in Exhibit
"C" (residential development), the return on equity for
housing in Exhibit "D" would be only 4.8%. Clearly, the
residential scenario needs to be revised, if possible, to
reflect competitive rent levels and thus maximize ab-
sorption potential.
MARKET EVALUATION
The following comments relate to the market analyses prepared
by the B.R.A.:
The analysis presented by the B.R.A. relating to the
housing market is not detailed enough to establish a
realistic market demand and absorption. The important
factor of rental ranges for the Park Plaza project
should be equated with potential demand to effectively
estimate absorption rates. It is our opinion that for
rental ranges in excess of $700 per month, strong market
demand would not be optimized.
The brief methodology used by the B.R.A. to establish
demand for retail space indicates that between 1,000,000
and 1,800,000 square feet of space could be absorbed
given a proper mix of retail and entertainment uses.
The office market in downtown Boston is greatly depend-
ent on general economic conditions in the future.
Without the backup of a complete office market survey
and the general uncertainty in the near future, an
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accurate judgment is not obtainable at this time.
It is our impression from our activity in the local
market that the B.R.A. projections are not out of
line and in fact if office space at Park Plaza is
planned with a realistic assessment of prime office
space absorption in the next few years, absorption
of 1,100,000 sq. ft. of space at Park Plaza is within
reasonable development guidelines.
The ERA report doesn't generate great confidence in the BRA data.
This thesis will privisionally accept the BRA estimates, and concentrate
the sensitivity analysis on the importance of the revenue projections.
This sensitivity analysis will test specifically the relationship
between the Residual Market Value and 1) the revenue premiums that Park
Plaza can achieve, and 2) the occupancy level.
In addition, the BRA figures will be adjusted somewhat to reflect
the fact that they generally represent the "all goes well" estimate of
future cash flows as opposed to the expected (mean) estimate of future
cash flows.
-112-
Chapter 8 - Footnotes
1. BRA (January 9, 1975).
2. BRA, Park Plaza: Defining the Alternatives, (February 4, 1975).
3. BRA, Park Plaza: Development Staging Plan, (March, 1975).
4. The BRA has prepared a listing of its reference works as of
March, 1974. It has also prepared a listing of 215 documents
relevant to Park Plaza.
5. Including:
a) Gladstone Associates, Retail Opportunities, Park Plaza
Site, (August, 1971).
b) Gladstone Associates, Luxury Housing Opportunities,
Park Plaza Site (July, 1971).
6. BRA (January 9, 1975), p. 8.
7. BRA (February 4, 1975), p. 7.
8. BRA (January 9, 1975), pp. 33-62.
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CHAPTER 9
SPECIFICATION OF FINANCIAL AND FEDERAL TAX PROGRAM
This section specifies the components of the Financial and Tax
Programs. This information falls into three groups: the set of ex-
pected returns and rates of inflation, the determinants of the amount
and term of private debt, and the determinants of the Federal Tax
claims. Again, the focus of this thesis is not the collection of the
optimal data, but much of this information can be specified adequately
for our purposes by reference to similar financial products. The
structure of private debt will follow that put forward by the BRA.
The determinants of the federal tax program are primarily specified
by the tax code.
As a result of the assumptions made in Sections 4 and 5, the
following rates must be specified:
k = the expected return on after federal tax cash flows
of the unleveraged project.
ic = the expected return on short term market debt.
i = the expected return on long term market debt.
i = the expected return on general obligation long term
m municipal bonds.
zr = the expected growth rate of rental revenues.
z = the expected growth rate of expenses, or the
expected rate of inflation (long term).
Before specifying these rates as they will be used in this
analysis, a review of the previous work indicates the relative
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structure between the rates. From Section 4, we know that the ex-
pected return on the equity of the unleveraged project is higher
than the expected return on market debt. Since the municipal bond
rate reflects the priority claims on local real estate assets, it
is lower than the expected return on "risky" debt. The long term
municipal bond rate would be expected to exceed the expected rate
of inflation. Rental revenues would be expected to grow more slowly
(if at all) than prices in general, reflecting the actual economic
depreciation of the project as it gets older and more outdated. There-
fore, it would be expected that
k > i , i p> i m> ze > zrc p m e r
Recent offerings have been placed in the municipal bond market
with yields on long term portions ranging between 6% and 7% tax free.1
The BRA has used 6% as the long term projected municipal bond rate in
its work.2 Based on this long term tax free riskless rate, it will be
assumed that the expected rate of inflation is 3%, i.e., that the real
riskless return is expected to be 3% in the long run. It will also be
assumed that rental revenues grow at only 2%, which is roughly equi-
valent to assuming that the real rent will be about 60% of what it is
now at the end of the project's life.
The BRA has indicated that its conversations with members of the
financial community have shown that long term private debt would ex-
pect a return of between 9% and 9.5% on a project of this type,
assuming that debt payments represented about 80% of net cash flow.3
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The term of this debt would be between 30 and 35 years. Under the
current term structure (with prime rate at 7%) short term rates
are similar to long rates.
It is difficult to specify an expected return on the unleveraged
equity because rates quoted in the market are generally based on the
expected return on the leveraged equity. It is not unusual to find
expected returns on leveraged equity of 15% to 20% after tax on
speculative real estate. Using a simple weighted cost of capital
formula, an expected return of 9.5% on debt and an expected return
on equity of 20%, and a ratio of cash to debt to cash to equity of
3 to 1, then the overall return would be 12%. Assuming an expected
return on the market of 9% and a riskless rate of 6%, a market
sensitivity of 2 would result in an expected return of 12% according
to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which is consistent with ob-
served beta's of companies in real estate based businesses (roughly).5
It will be assumed here that short term debt is refinanced at
the point when the component achieves an occupancy level of 50%.
That implies that
t* = (t' - t")/2.
It will be assumed that the marginal tax rate of the equity
holders is 50% on ordinary income. Tax preferences will be ignored.
Depreciable lives and allowed acceleration are specified in the
first Appendix.
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Chapter 9 - Footnotes
1. Wall Street Journal, (June 16, 1975), "Tax Exempts."
2. Ganz, Menconeri, et al., (1973).
3. BRA (January 9, 1975), p. 44.
4. Andre Schwartz, Lehman Brothers
5. Value Line.
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CHAPTER 10
SPECIFICATION OF LOCAL TAX PROGRAM
In the summary of the model in Chapter 7, it was shown that the
RMV is a function of the specific form of claims used by local govern-
ment to recover the residual value. Restating Eq. (10) from that
chapter,
(1) RMV = NMV
+ T[R'][g ][F(RR) + F(CR) - F(IP)]
- U[A][g ][F(DP)]
While Eq. (1) indicates that RMV is an increasing function of the
local tax rate, T, and a decreasing function of the level of capital
contributions, U, feasible combinations of U and T are determined by
the private feasibility constraint. In order to maintain private
feasibility,
(2) NMV = T[R'][[F(RR) + F(CR)](1-g e) + F(IP)g ]
- U[(L)F(LA) + (A-L)F(CX) - (A)F(DP)g ]
Since both sets of coefficients are positive, an increase in the
tax rate requires an increase in public capital contributions.1 This
result is not surprising: as more cash flow is diverted to the local
government, less is available to support return on private capital,
which must be replaced by public capital. A closer examination of
Eq. (2) indicates that increasing the tax rate creates reduced burden
to the extent that federal taxes are reduced by deduction of the tax
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payments. On the other hand, increasing the use of public financing
reduces the amount of private debt that can be supported by project
cash flow, and therefore reduces the tax deductions for interest.
The required increase in public capital contributions also decreases
the depreciable basis of private contributions, and resulting tax
savings.
We will assume here that the local government determines its
program of claims so as to maximize the Residual Market Value. We
will further assume that there are political constraints on the local
tax program.
Since RMV is a linear function of both U and T, RMV is maximized
by combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) in terms of either U or T, and
determining the sign of the coefficient relating that program
variable to RMV. RMV is maximized by increasing variables with
positive coefficient to the point of political constraint (or non-
negativity constraint inherent in the model itself.)
Combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) to eliminate U, the coefficient
on T in the function for RMV is
(3) [R'][ge][F(RR) + F(CR) - F(IP)]
[A][g ][F(DP)][R'][[F(RR)+F(CR)](1-ge)+F(IP)ge]
(L)F(LA) + (A-L)F(CX) - (A)F(DP)ge
Removing the strictly positive terms, setting the federal tax rate
at 50%, and reorganizing, the coefficient becomes
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(4) 1 F(IP) (A)F(DP)F(RR) + F(CR) (L)F(LA) + (A-L)F(CX)
The first term represents the ratio of the present value of
interest payments supportable by a dollar of rental income at sub-
stantial occupancy to the present value of rental income over the
life of the project per dollar of rental income at substantial
occupancy. The second term represents the ratio of the present
value of depreciation (of all capital costs) to the present value
of all capital expenditures. The negative sign on the first term
indicates that the increasing uses of public finance (increasing U
and T) reduces the tax savings from the use of private debt, but also
increases the tax savings from deduction of local taxes. The second
term reflects the lost tax savings as increasing use of public capital
reduces the depreciable basis of private capital, but reduces the
private capital required.
The actual sign of the coefficient turns out to depend on the
type of space being considered. Since all uses are financed on sim-
ilar long term basis, with debt service consuming the same portion
of cash flow, the first term is relatively constant for all uses at
72%. The second term, though, depends more heavily on the type of
space. Residential space is depreciable on a 200% declining balance
basis while other space must be depreciated on a 150% declining
balance basis. The loss of depreciable basis is therefore more
costly in the case of residential space. The second term takes on
values between 23% and 25% for non-residential space, and between
30% and 33% for residential space.
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The result is that the sign of the coefficient on T is positive
for non-residential space and negative for residential space. There
are two implications. First, RNV is maximized by increasing the use
of public financing of non-residential space and decreasing the use
of public financing of residential space. Second, in either case,
the increase in RMV will not be substantial.
The local government tax rate will be set at the maximum political
limit for non-residential space and at the minimum for residential
space. The BRA has specified a rate of 23% as the maximum to be
applied to Park Plaza, while Chapter 121A sets 10% as the minimum.2
The rate applied to hotel income will be reduced to 12%, reflecting
the net income after hotel service expenses.
-121-
Chapter 10 - Footnotes
1. The coefficient on T is clearly positive as all F( )'s are
positive and 0 < g < 1. The coefficient on U represents
the difference between the present value of capital expendi-
ture and the present value of depreciation deductions. Since
total capital expenditure equals the total depreciation de-
ductions, and all expenditures precede deductions, the
coefficient must be positive.
2. BRA (January 9, 1975), pp. 41-43.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Based on the work presented in Appendix C, the following summary
results can be presented:
RMV RMV
Alternative Parcels Redeveloped Parcels not Redeveloped
SIX MILLION $ 12,009,000
FIVE MILLION 16,830,000 $ 2,335,000
FOUR MILLION 11,006,000 10,325,000
THREE MILLION PLUS 11,903,000 15,334,000
THREE MILLION MINUS 3,588,000 15,334,000
TWO MILLION ( 2,170,000) 27,283,000
RMV is maximized at the THREE MILLION PLUS level, but the
TWO MILLION alternative has lower RMV as a result of the negative
value of the new development. It is also clear that no development
at all would show the greatest RMV.
The most resounding result from this work is that at current
market prices, major redevelopment doesn't make sense, regardless
of the land costs involved. Residential development is the
most striking example. In all cases, independent of the land
costs absorbed, the residential components of the development
alternatives has negative Net Market Value. Simply, new,
privately financed, residential development has not been feasible
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for the last decade. The infeasibility of residential development
has controlled and dominated the analysis in many respects. The
larger development alternatives become less valuable as more residential
space is added. Since residential development is the marginal use
included in the project as the scope expands, the larger alternatives
have a heavier burden to carry.
A sensible re-orientation of development alternatives would reduce the
proportion of the low value uses (residential and parking) and re-
place them with the higher value uses (hotel, retail, and office).
It is certainly clear that the RMV responds much more directly to
changes in the use mix than to changes in development density or
scope. In no case does any use have to absorb more than $12 in
land acquisition costs, In many cases, residential space has a
negative RMV of about $12 per square foot. Eliminating one square
foot of residential space can therfore impact on RMV more heavily
than reducing the land cost on any component to zero.
From the TWO MILLION alternative, the average RMV of parcels
not redeveloped is about $ 35 per square foot of existing building.
From the SIX MILLION alternative, the RMV of office and retail
space is about $5 (depending on land cost) per square foot of new
construction. It is therefore necessary to replace each square
foot of existing building with about seven times as much new
construction to maintain the same level of RMV. The hotel
development only requires doubling the amount of space on the
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site. This upgrading of the density is not at all unreasonable given
the amount of vacant land now in the project area, and the low height
of the currently existing buildings.
While the alternatives generated by the BRA may warrant the low
RMV because of the other non-marketable benefits, it is clear that
alternatives producing greater RMV per square foot of development
could be constructed. The focusing of development on the parcels
most underutilized, and using the more valuable re-uses could clearly
produce a redevelopment scheme that increases RMV of all development
on site.
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APPENDIX A
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t RijLR i ,n 1
Interest Payment
I K - P
t t
Outstanding Balance
M = M[1-[SW. ]/[SW.t i ,t i,
p p
Present Value of Interest
X-1
t K - M(1/RWi ,n-i P)(l+i )PV[It ] =E 1i
t -- (1+i)x
K
(l+i)
= K
x(1+i)
= K[RW. ] -
i,t
M(1/RW. 
-i ) (1+i )
_~ ip~n p p
(1+i)x
/RW. -i 1+i t
-p M Pn ppM-1+i +
1/RWi 
,n-'
M +i [RW. ]1 .,t
i-i
p 1+i
p
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RW.
= RWi n
1
1+i
p
RWipi,t
SW.
Depreciation
Period's Deduction - Declining Balance
D, = q/N (B)
D2 = q/N (B-D1 ) = (B)q/N(l-q/N)
Dt = B(q/N)(l-q/N)tl
Depreciable Basis
t
Bt = B - D
= B - B(q/N)(1-qN)t-1
= B[l - q/N]t
Present Value of Depreciation
t
PV[Dt ]=Z
x=1
SB(q/N)
(1-q/N)
B(q/N)
(1-q/N)
B(q/N) (l-q/N) / (l+i)
Z1 1
(1+Q) X
Si+q/N
l-q/N
RWQt
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Review of Internal Revenue Code
Sections 167 and 1250 -
Depreciation and Recapture Rules
_
Retail
Office
Residential
Hotel
Parking
Retail
Office
Hotel
Parking
1.5
1.5
2.0
1.5
1.5
Applicable Percentage
100
100
100
100
Residential 100 - (t-100)
t = Useful life in months
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Use N
45
45
40
45
45
Use
APPENDIX B
ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM DATA
This Appendix specifies the data comprising the architectural
program of the six development alternatives. First, current market
prices are specified. These prices have been adjusted to reflect
expected changes in the price level in the architectural program
of each of the alternatives. For each alternative, a schematic
site plan is presented. This plan indicates the probable location
of each of the development components. Buildings shown as solid
are high-rise towers. Diagonally striped buildings are mid-rise,
while lightly dotted buildings are low-rise. Buildings to remain
are uncolored.
The aggregate development program for each alternative is
then presented. This program indicates the amount of each type
of building use to be developed or maintained in each phase of
development. All such numbers represent gross square feet.
The architectural program specification gives the basic
market prices and dev&opment schedule. It also disaggregates the
development by type of use on each parcel. All times (t's) are
in months. All prices are on annual basis per gross square foot
of new development.
BASE MARKET PRICES AT t = 0 (1976)
OFFICE RETAIL RESIDENTIAL HOTEL PARKING
Construction Cost per Gross Sq. Ft. (A)
$ 44.00 $ 39.00 $ 38.00 $ 60.00 $ 15.00
Construction Expense per Gross Sq. Ft, (E 0 -t')
$ 1.00 $ 1,00 $ 2.00 $ 5.00 $ 1.00
Annual Rent per Net Rentable Sq. Ft.
$ 11.00 $ 10.00 $ 5.60 $ 37.50
Building Efficiency ( Net Rentable Sq. Ft./Gross Sq. Ft.)
85% 85% 85% 80%
Annual Rent per Gross Sq. Ft.
$ 9,35 $ 8.50 $ 4.75
Vacancy Rate
5% 5% 5%
Expected Rent at Substantial Occupancy (R')
$ 4.50 $ 18.00 $ 2.50
Operating Expense per Gross Sq. Ft, (EI)
$ 1.00 $ 8.00 $ .50
-132-
$ 30.00
40%
$ 8,88 $ 8.08
$ 2.25 $ 2.00
LAND ACQUISITION COSTS
PARCEL ACQUISITION PRICE
(1) $ 2,561,510
(2) $ 2,561,510
(4) $ 5,438,500
(5) $ 2,289,544
(6) $ 4,306,700
(7) $ 1,297,497
(8) $ 1,894,250
(9,10) $ 4,230,737
(11) $ 1,497,056
Total $ 26,077,364
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SIX MILLION - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
404500 777000
945500
473500
1823500
110000
1078000
1965000 581000 1023500
Total New Development -- 5,744,000 square feet
Total Retention 0 square feet
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PHASE
One
Two
Three
Total
RETAIL
160000
69000
122000
351000
HOTEL
581000
PARKING
566000
457500
SIX MILLION
PHASE ONE
- ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM SPECIFICATION
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
t"o
t' I
12
24
36
36
60
A-L
R'
E' I
E"l
E*
42.00
9.39
2.32
1.74
.21
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
12
12
36
36
60
46.75
10.32
2.61
1.96
.21
12
24
42
42
66
41.25
5.31
1.18
.88
.43
L
(4)
(5)
(6)
8.58
2.46
4.66
Gross Sq. Ft.
(4) 87000
(5) 31000
(6) 42000
8,58
4.66
352500
52000
8,58
2.46
4.66
195000
130000
452000
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HOTEL
12
6
30
30
54
62.75
20.60
9.15
4.58
1.08
PARKING
12
12
30
30
60
15.80
2.90
.58
.52
.21
2.46
581000
2.46
4.66
187500
378500
SIX MILLION - PHASE TWO
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
ti"
t'
A-L
E0
48
60
72
72
96
46.00
10.27
2.54
1.91
.23
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
48
48
84
72
108
51.85
11.63
2.95
2.21
.23
L
(1)
(2)
3.10
8.58
3,10
8.58
Gross Sq. Ft.
(1)
(2)
23000
46000
803000
142500
-137-
48
60
72
72
96
44.80
5.72
1.27
.95
.47
8.58
110000
SIX MILLION - PHASE THREE
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
til
t'
A-L
R'
E'
E"l
E*
84
108
120
120
144
51.85
11.58
2.87
2.15
.22
L (7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
Gross Sq.
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
7.59
7.41
3.30
3.53
Ft.
18000
35000
38000
31000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
84
96
120
114
144
57,60
12.72
3.22
2.42
.22
7.59
7.41
3.30
3.53
153000
220500
70000
30000
84
84
120
108
144
49.00
6.45
1.43
1.07
.44
3.30
3.53
850000
228000
-138-
PARKING
84
84
108
108
144
19.05
3.58
.72
.64
.22
3.30
3.53
322500
135000
f74
"I
DUN
IILO050Ul
-139-
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FIVE MILLION - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
PHASE
One
Two
Three
Total
RETAIL
160000
69000
91000
320000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
456500
945500
513500
1915500
325000
110000
850000
1285000
Total New Development -- 4,883,500 square feet
Retention
(11) 33169
Total Retention
Total Development
11056
-- 44,225 square feet
-- 4,927,725 square feet
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HOTEL
581000
PARKING
467000
315000
581000 782000
FIVE MILLION - ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM SPECIFICATION
PHASE ONE
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
ti
t -
A-L
A-L
R'
E' I
E"l
(6)
(4,5)
E0
12
24
36
36
60
27.72
42.00
9.39
2.32
1.74
.21
L
(4) 8.58
(5) 2.57
(6) 7.00
Gross Sq. Ft.
(4) 87000
(5) 31000
(6) 42000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
12
12
36
36
60
30,86
46,75
10.32
2.61
1.96
.21
12
24
42
42
66
41.25
5.31
1.18
.88
.43
HOTEL
12
6
30
30
54
62.75
20.60
9.15
4.58
1.08
PARKING
12
12
30
30
60
10.43
15.80
2.90
.58
.52
.21
8.58 8.58
2.57
7.00
2.57 -
352500 195000
130000
2.57
7.00
150000
317000104000
581000
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FIVE MILLION - PHASE TWO
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
tl
48
60
72
72
96
A-L
E 0
46,00
10.27
2.54
1.91
.23
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
48
48
84
72
108
51.85
11.63
2.95
2.21
.23
L
(1)
(2)
3.10
8,58
3,10
8.58
Gross Sq. Ft.
(1)
(2)
23000
46000
803000
142500
-142-
48
60
72
72
96
44.80
5.72
1.27
.95
.47
8,58
110000
FIVE MILLION - PHASE THREE
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL 84
tc 108
td 120
120
t' 144
A-L
R'
E '
E"l
E*a
51.85
11.58
2.87
2.15
.22
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
84
96
120
114
144
57,60
12.72
3.22
2.42
.22
84
84
120
108
144
49.00
6.45
1.43
1.07
,44
L
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
7959
7.41
3.15
Gross Sq, Ft,
(7) 18000
(8) 35000
(9,10) 38000
7.59
7.41
3.15
153000
220500
140000
3.15
850000
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PARKING
84
84
108
108
144
19.05
3.58
.72
.64
.22
3.15
315000
Y
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SCHEMATIC SITE PLAN:4M -0/ zoo
FOUR MILLION - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
RETAIL
160000
92000
252000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
506000
583500
1089500
325000
850000
1175000
HOTEL
581000
581000
Total New Development -- 3,754,000 square feet
Retention (11), (1), (2)
63,175
Total Retention
Total Development
199527
-- 262,702 square feet
-- 4,016,702 square feet
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PHASE
One
Two
Total
PARKING
415500
241000
656500
FOUR MILLION - ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM SPECIFICATION
PHASE ONE
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
t"e
t -
A-L
A-L
R'
E'
E"l
E*
(6)
(4,5)
12
24
36
36
60
27.72
42.00
9.39
2.32
1.74
.21
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
L
(4)
(5)
(6)
8.58
2.57
6.98
Gross Sq. Ft.
(4) 87000
(5) 31000
(6) 42000
12
12
36
36
60
30.86
46.75
10.32
2.61
1.96
.21
12
24
42
42
66
41.25
5.31
1.18
.88
.43
HOTEL
12
6
30
30
54
62.75
20.60
9.15
4.58
1.08
PARKING
12
12
30
30
60
10.43
15.80
2.90
.58
.52
.21
8.58 8.58
2.57
6.98
2.57
352500 195000
130000
2.57
6.98
150000
265500156500
581000
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FOUR MILLION - PHASE TWO
VARIABLE
tL
tc
td
ti
A-L
RI
E'
E"l
E*
RETAIL
54
78
90
90
114
48,10
10.74
2.66
1.99
.25
(7) 7.59
(8) 7,41
(9,10) 3,15
Gross Sq. Ft.
(7) 18000
(8) 35000
(9,10) 39000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54
66
90
84
114
53.46
11.80
2.99
2.24
.25
54
54
90
90
114
45.83
5.98
1.33
1.00
.49
PARKING
54
54
78
78
114
17.69
3.32
.66
.60
.25
L
7.59
7.41
3.15
153000
220500
210000
3.15
850000
3.15
241000
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THREE MILLION PLUS - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
PHASE
One
Two
Total
RETAIL
160000
39000
199000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
509000
210000
719000
Total New Development -- 3,330,500 square feet
Retention (11), (1),
105666
(2), (7), (8)
317091
Total Retention
Total Development
-- 422,757 square feet
-- 3,753,257 square feet
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HOTEL
581000
581000
325000
850000
1175000
PARKING
415500
241000
656500
THREE MILLION PLUS - ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM SPECIFICATION
PHASE ONE
VARIABLE RETAIL
tL
tc
td
ti"
12
24
36
36
60
A-L (6)
A-L (4,5)
E0
27.72
42.00
9.39
2.32
1.74
.21
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
12
12
36
36
60
30,86
46,75
10.32
2.61
1.96
.21
L
(4)
(5)
(6)
8.58
2.57
6.98
8.58
6,98
Gross Sq. Ft.
(4)
(5)
(6)
87000
31000
42000
352500
156500
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12
24
42
42
66
41.25
5.31
1.18
.88
.43
HOTEL
12
6
30
30
54
62.75
20.60
9.15
4.58
1.08
PARKING
12
12
30
30
60
10.43
15.80
2.90
.58
.52
.21
8.58
2,57 2.57 2.57
6.98
195000
130000 581000 150000
265500
THREE MILLION PLUS - PHASE TWO
RESIDENTIAL
54
54
90
90
114
45.83
5.98
1.33
.49
3.15
Gross Sq. Ft.
850000
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VARIABLE
tL
tc
td
t"L
t v
A-L
E0
L (9,10)
RETAIL
54
78
90
90
114
48.10
10,74
2.66
1.99
.25
3.15
OFFICE
54
66
90
84
114
53.46
11.80
2.99
2,24
.25
3.15
PARKING
54
54
78
78
114
17.69
3.32
.66
.60
.25
3.15
39000 210000 241000
THREE MILLION MINUS - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
PHASE RETAIL
160000
39000
Total 199000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
367500
183000
530500
325000
570000
895000
Total New Development -- 2,504,000 square feet
Retention (11), (1),
124047
(2), (7), (8), part of (10)
372239
Total Retention
Total Development
-- 496,286 square feet
-- 3,000,786 square feet
-152-
One
Two
HOTEL
320000
320000
PARKING
378000
182000
560000
THREE MILLION MINUS - ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM SPECIFICATION
PHASE ONE
VARIABLE
tL
tc
td
t"t
t'
A-L (4,5)
A-L (6)
E 0
RETAIL
12
24
36
36
60
42.00
27.72
9.39
2,32
1.74
.21
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
12
12
37
36
60
46.75
30.86
10.32
2.61
1.96
.21
12
24
42
42
66
41.25
5.31
1.18
.88
.43
L
11.03(4)
(5)
(6)
3,86
6.98
11.03 11.03
3.86
6,98
Gross Sq, Ft.
(4)
(5)
(6)
87000
31000
42000
211000 195000
130000
156500
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HOTEL
12
6
30
30
54
62.75
20.60
9.15
4.58
1.08
PARKING
12
12
30
30
60
15.80
10.43
2.90
.58
.52
.21
3.86 3.86
6.98
320000 112500
265500
THREE MILLION MINUS - PHASE TWO
VARIABLE
tL
tc
td
t"t
A-L
R'
E'
E"l
E*
RETAIL
54
78
90
90
114
48.10
10.74
2.66
1.99
,25
L
(%i0) 3.11
Gross Sq. Ft.
39000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL PARKING
54
66
90
84
114
53.46
11,80
2.99
2.24
.25
3.11
183000
54
54
90
90
114
45.83
5.98
1.33
1.00
.49
3.11
570000
54
54
78
78
114
17.69
3.32
,66
.60
.25
3.11
182000
-154-
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TWO MILLION - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
PHASE
One
Total
RETAIL
47000
47000
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
351500
351500
407500
407500
Total New Development -- 806,000 square feet
Retention (11) , (1),
94371
(2) , (7) , (8) , (9,10) , (6)
534711
Total Retention
Total Development
-- 1,189,142 square feet
-- 1,995,142 square feet
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PARKING
560000
TWO MILLION - ARCHITECTURAL PROGRAM SPECIFICATION
RESIDENTIAL
12
24
42
42
66
41.25
5.31
1.18
.88
.43
7.40
5.92
Gross Sq. Ft.
351500
407500
-157-
VARIABLE
tL
tc
td
A-L
RETAIL
12
24
36
36
60
42.00
9.39
2.32
1.74
.21
OFFICE
12
12
36
36
60
46.75
10.32
2.61
1.96
.21
L
(4)
(5)
7.40
5.92
(4)
(5)
28000
19000
APPENDIX C
RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT
This section computes the RMV for each development component
of the six development alternatives as specified in the body of
the text. The first page provides a summary of the RMV of each
component of the development alternative. Behind that is the
computation of RMV from redeveloped parcels. All such computations
are done in terms of dollars per gross square foot of new development.
Following that is a computation of the RMV of unredeveloped parcels
and the contribution of taxes prior to eminent domain taking to
the RMV of redeveloped parcels.
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SIX MILLION - RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENTS
RMVnew RMVoldCOMPONENT
Phase One
Gross Sq. Ft.
Retail
Office
Residential
Hotel
Parking
(4) 4.21
(5)
(6)
(4)
(6)
(4) (
(5) (
(6) (
9.61
7.67
3.41
6,75
12.33)
6,87)
8.83)
(5) 17.83
(5)
(6)
.37)
2.31)
Phase Two
Retail
Office
Residential
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(2)
7.05
3.67
6,10
2.84
.57
.16
.31
.57
.31
.57
.16
,31
.16
.16
.31
.76
2.11
.76
2.11
( 8.86) 2.11
87,000
31,000
42,000
352,500
52,000
195,000
130,000
452,000
581,000
187,500
378,500
23,000
46,000
803,000
142,500
110,000
415,000
303,000
335,000
1,403,000
367,000
(2,293,000)
( 872,000)
(3,854,000)
10,451,000
38,000)
756,000)
180,000
266,000
5,511,000
705,000
( 742,000)
Phase Three
Retail (7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
Office (7) 2.94
(8) 3,02
(9,10) 4.72
(11) 4,63
RMV
2.28
2,35
4.03
3,95
3.11
3.03
1.35
1.44
3.11
3,03
1.35
1.44
18,000
35,000
38,000
31,000
153,000
220,500
70,000
30,000
97,000
189,000
205,000
167,000
926,000
1,335,000
425,000
182,000
-159-
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(
Phase Three - Con't.
COMPONENT
Residential
Parking
RMVNEW RMVold
(9,10) ( 4.39) 1.35
(11) ( 4.49) 1.44
(9,10) ( .54) 1.35
(11) ( .64) 1.44
Gross Sq. Ft.
850,000
228,000
322,500
135,000
RMV
(2,582,000)
( 694,000)
260,000
109,000
TOTAL RMV FROM REDEVELOPED PARCELS $ 12,009,000
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SIX MILLION - PHASE ONE
PARCEL
R' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E" (.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
H
NET MARKET VALUE
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RETAIL
49.30
12.86
.40
.54
25.36
6.69
1.92
3.64
3.44
8.22
6.50
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54.18
14.47
.40
.54
29.50
6.69
3.64
2.67
5.63
26.26
6.16
.86
.26
22.85
6.55
1.88
3.54
(10.42)
( 5.74)
( 7.43)
*
T (R') (.5) [F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
HOTEL
114.81
53.84
1.87
1.50
42.04
1.96
13.60
PARKING
15.66
3.30
.40
.21
10.23
1.92
3.64
.41)
( 2.13)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
.76
1.39
1.16
4.21
9.61
7.67
.74
1.13
3.41
6.75
( 1.91)
1.12)
1.41)
(12.33)
6.87)
( 8.83)
4.23
17.83
.04
( .18)
( .37)
2.31)
SIX MILLION - PHASE TWO
PARCEL
R' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E"(.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)(F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)] (1)
(2)
RETAIL
53.92
14.08
.44
.59
27.77
2.42
6.70
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL HOTEL
57.33
15.31
.50
1.00
31.10
2.37
6.56
30.03
7.04
.88
.29
25.73
6.70
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (,5) [F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
PARKING
I
(1)
(2)
8.62
4.34
1.47
.91
7.05
3.67
7.34
3.16
1.38
.90
6.10
2.84
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(10.61)
( 2.06)
( 8.86)
SIX MILLION - PHASE.THREE
PARCEL
R' (.5) (F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) (F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E"(.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
I
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T(R') (.5) [F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
RETAIL
52.39
14.12
.47
.59
27.78
5.67
5.53
2.47
2.64
3.77
3.90
6.97
6.80
.90
.91
1.30
1.28
2.27
2.35
4.04
3.95
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
60.94
16.27
.47
.87
32.66
5.76
5.62
2.50
2.68
4.94
5.07
8.19
8.01
1.09
1.11
1.49
1.47
2.94
3.02
4.73
4.63
31.79
7.42
.93
.48
28.13
2.52
2.70
( 7.70)
( 7.87)
( 1.29)
( 1.31)
( 4.39)
( 4.49)
HOTEL PARKING
17.65
3.74
t.47
.29
11.73
2.52
2.70
( 1.10)
( 1.27)
( .02)
.04)
( .54)
( .64)
SIX MILLION - RMVold
PARCEL
Phase One
Phase Two
Phase Three
RMV
.57
.16
.31
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
L
8.58
2,46
4.66
3.10
8.58
7.59
7.41
3.30
3.53
tL
12
12
12
48
48
84
84
84
84
.76
2.11
3.11
3.03
1.35
1.44
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FIVE MILLION - RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT
COMPONENT
Phase One
Retail
RMVnew Hmold
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)Office
Residential
Hotel
Parking
4,21
9,52
15.38
3.31
(6) 16.01
(4)
(5)
12.33)
( 6,97)
(5) 15.69
(5)
(6)
.46)
,65)
Phase Two
Retail
Office
Residential
Phase Three
Retail
Office
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
7.05
3,67
6.10
2.83
(2) ( 8.86)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
2.28
2.35
4.05
2.94
3,02
4.79
.57
.17
.46
.57
.46
.57
.17
.17
.17
.46
.76
2.11
.76
2.11
2.11
3,11
3.03
1.29
3.11
3.03
1.29
Gross Sq. Ft.
87,000
31,000
42,000
352,500
104,000
195,000
130,000
581,000
150,000
317,000
23,000
46,000
803,000
142,500
110,000
18,000
35,000
38,000
153,000
220,500
14,000
RMV
415,000
300,000
666,000
1,368,000
1,713,000
(2,293,000)
883,000)
9,217,000
(
(
44,000)
60,000)
180,000
266,000
5,511,000
705,000
742,000)
97,000
189,000
203,000
926,000
1,335,000
85,000
-:165-
(
(
RMVnew RMVold Gross Sq. Ft.
Phase Three, con't.
Residential (9,10) ( 4.32)
Parking
1.29
(9,10) ( .48) 1,29
850,000
315,000
(2,579,000)
255,000
TOTAL RMV FORM REDEVELOPED PARCELS $ 16,830,000
Parcels Not Redeveloped
(11) - 52,79 44,225 2,335,000
TOTAL RMV $ 19,165,000
-166-
RMVCOMPONENT
FIVE MILLION - PHASE ONE
PARCEL
R' (.5) (F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E"(.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (.5) (F-(RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)J
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
(4,5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RETAIL
49.30
12.86
.40
.54
25.36
16,74
6.70
2.01
5.46
3.44
8,14
13.30
,76
1.38
2.09
4.21
9.52
15.38
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54.18
14.47
.40
.54
29.50
19.48
6.70
5.46
2.57
13.83
.74
2.18
3.31
16.01
26.26
6.16
.86
.26
22.85
22.85
6.55
1.96
(10.42)
( 5.83)
( 1.91)
1.13)
(12.33)
( 6.97)
I
HOTEL
114.81
53.84
1.87
1.50
42.04
42,04
2.05
PARKING
15.66
3.30
.40
.21
10.23
7.02
2.01
5.46
13.51 .49)
.67)
2.18 .03
.02
15.69 .46)
.65)
(
(
(
(
FIVE MILLION - PHASE TWO
PARCEL
R' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E" (.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)] (1)
(2)
RETAIL
53.92
14.08
.44
.59
27.77
2.42
6.70
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
57.33
15.31
.50
1.00
31.10
2.37
6.56
30.03
7.04
.88
.29
25.73
6.70
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (,5) [F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
HOTEL PARKING
I
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
8.62
4.34
1.47
.91
7.05
3.67
7.34
3.16
1.38
.90
6.10
2.84
(10.61)
( 2.06)
( 8.86)
FIVE MILLION - PHASE THREE
PARCEL
R' (.5) (F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) (F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)}
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E"(.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
1ON
NET MARKET VALUE
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
RETAIL
52.39
14.12
.47
.59
27.78
5.67
5.54
2.35
3.77
3.90
7.09
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
60.94
16.27
.47
.87
32.66
5.76
5.62
2.39
4.94
5.07
8.30
31.79
7.42
.93
.48
28.13
2.41
( 7.58)
*
T (R') (.5) (F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(7)
(8)
(9,10) ( 4.32) ( .48)
HOTEL PARKING
17.65
3.74
.47
.29
11.73
2.41
.98)
.90
.91
1.21
2.28
2.35
4.05
( 1.27)
1.09
1.11
1.50
2.94
3.02
4.79
( .00)
FIVE MILLION 
- RMVold
PARCEL
Phase One
Phase Two
Phase Three
Not Redeveloped
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
L
8.58
2.57
7.00
3.10
8.58
7.59
7.41
3,15
33.85
Lt
12
12
12
48
48
84
84
84
RMV
.57
.17
.46
.76
2.11
3.10
3.03
1.29
52.79
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FOUR MILLION - RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT
RMVnew RMVoldCOMPONENT
Phase One
Gross Sq. Ft.
Retail
Office
Residential
(4) 4.21
(5) 9,52
(6) 15.38
(4)
(6)
(4)
(5)
3.31
16.01
.57
.17
.46
.57
.46
( 12.33) .57
6.97) .17
87,000
31,000
42,000
352,500
156,500
415,000
300,000
666,000
1,368,000
2,578,000
195,000 ( 2,293,000)
130,000 ( 883,000)
(5) 15.69
(5) (
(6)
.46)
.65)
.17
.17
.46
581,000
150,000 (
265,500 (
9,217,000
44,000)
51,000)
Phase Two
Retail
Office
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
Residential(9,10)
Parking
3.52
3.62
5.99
2.08
2.03
.86
3,28 2,08
3.38 2.03
5,77
( 5.88)
(9,10) ( .78)
.86
.86
.86
18,000
35,000
39,000
153,000
220,500
210,000
101,000
198,000
267,000
821,000
1,194,000
1,394,000
850,000 ( 4,261,000)
241,000 19,000
TOTAL RMV FROM REDEVELOPED PARCELS $ 11,006,000
Parcels Not Redeveloped
(11) - 52,79 44,225 2.335,000
(1) - 36.54 109,328 3,995,000
(2) - 36,54 109,328 3,995,000
TOTAL RMV FROM PARCELS NOT REDEVELOPED
TOTAL RMV
$ 10,325,000
$ 21,331,000
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RMV
Hotel
Parking
FOUR MILLION - PHASE ONE
PARCEL
R' (.5) (F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E"(.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP))
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
H
Is3
NET MARKET VALUE
(4,5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RETAIL
49.30
12.86
,40
.54
25.36
16,74
6.70
2.01
5.46
3.44
8,14
13.30
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54.18
14.47
.40
.54
29,50
19.48
6.70
5.46
2.57
13.83
26,26
6.16
.86
.26
22.85
22.85
6.55
1,96
(10.42)
( 5.83)
*
T (R') (.5) [F-(RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
HOTEL
114.81
53.84
1.87
1.50
42.04
42.04
2.05
PARKING
15.66
3.30
.40
.21
10.23
7.02
2.01
5.46
13.51 .49)
.67)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
.76
1.38
2.09
4.21
9,52
15,38
.74
2.18
3.31
16.01
2.18
( 1.91)
1.13)
(12.33)
( 6.97)
.03
.02
15.69 .46)
.65)
(
(
(
(
FOUR MILLION - PHASE TWO
PARCEL
R' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E" (. 5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
NET MARKET VALUE
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
RETAIL
50.04
13.08
.53
.55
25.77
5.67
5.54
2.35
4.44
4.58
7.76
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL HOTEL
56.54
15.10
.53
.81
30.31
5.76
5.62
2.39
4.04
4.18
7.41
29.47
6.90
1.05
.45
26.31
2.41
( 7.65)
*
T(R') (.5) [F(RR)+F(CR)-F(IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
PARKING
16.36
3.42
H
-3
(A
.53
.27
10.89
2.41
( 1.16)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
.92
.93
1.34
3.53
3.62
5.99
( 1.28)
.95
.96
1.36
3.28
3.38
5.77
( .03)
( 5.88) ( .78)
lw
FOUR MILLION 
- RMVold
PARCEL
Phase One
Phase Two
Not Redeveloped
L RMV
.57
.17
.46
tL
12
12
12
54
54
54
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(11)
(1)
(2)
8.58
2.57
6.98
7.59
7.41
3.15
33.85
23.43
23.43
2.08
2.03
.86
52.79
36.34
36.34
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THREE MILLION PLUS - RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT
RMVnew RMVold Gross Sq. Ft.
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(6)
(4)
(5)
4.21
9.52
15.38
3.31
16.01
( 12.33)
( 6.97)
(5) 15,69
(5)
(6)
,46)
.65)(
COMPONENT
Phase One
Retail
Office
Residential
87,000
31,000
42,000
352,500
156,500
RMV
415,000
300,000
666,000
1,368,000
2,578,000
195,000 ( 2,293,000)
130,000 ( 883,000)
581,000
150,000 (
265,500 (
9,217,000
44,000)
51,000)
Phase Two
Retail
Office
(9,10)
(9,10)
Residential(9,10)
5.99
5.77
( 5.88)
Parking (9,10) ( .78)
.87
.87
,87
.87
39,000
210,000
850,000
241,000
268,000
1,394,000
( 1,052,000)
20,000
TOTAL RMV FROM REDEVELOPED PARCELS $ 11,903,000
Parcels Not Redeveloped
(11) - 52.79 44,225 2,335,000
(1) - 36.54 109,328 3,995,000
(2) - 36.54 109,328 3,995,000
(7) - 31.64 63,950 2,024,000
(8) - 30.80 95,926 2,995,000
TOTAL RMV FROM PARCELS NOT REDEVELOPED
TOTAL RMV
$ 15,334,000
$ 27,247,000
-175-
.57
.17
.46
.57
.46
.57
.17
.17
.17
.46
Hotel
Parking
THREE MILLION PLUS - PHASE ONE
PARCEL
R' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP)]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E"(.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
ON
0I
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (.5) [F-(RR)+F (CR) -F (IP))
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
(4,5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RETAIL
49.30
12.86
.40
.54
25.36
16.74
6.70
2.01
5.46
3.44
8,14
13.30
.76
1.38
2.09
4.21
9.52
15.38
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54.18
14.47
.40
.54
29.50
19.48
6.70
5.46
2.57
13.83
.74
2.18
3.31
16.01
26.26
6.16
.86
.26
22.85
22.85
6.55
1.96
(10.42)
( 5.83)
( 1.91)
1.13)
(12.33)
( 6.97)
HOTEL
114.81
53.84
1.87
1.50
42.04
42.04
2.05
PARKING
15.66
3.30
.40
.21
10.23
7.02
2.01
5.46
13.51 .49)
.67)
2.18 .03
.02
15.69 .46)
.65)
(
(
(
(
THREE MILLION PLUS - PHASE TWO
PARCEL
R' (. 5) (F (RR)+F (CR)+F (IP) ]
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)J
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E" (.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)] (9,10)
RETAIL
50.04
13.08
.53
.55
25.77
2.35
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
56.54
15.10
.53
.81
30.31
2.39
29.47
6.90
1.05
.45
26.31
2.41
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (.5) (F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U (A) (.5)F (DP)
( 5.88) ( .78)
HOTEL PARKING
16.36
H
3.42
.53
.27
10.89
2.41
(9,10)
(9,10)
( 7.65)7.76
1.34
7.41
1.36
( 1,16)
( 1.28) ( .03)
(9,10) 5.99 5.77RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
THREE MILLION PLUS - RMVold
PARCEL
Phase One
Phase Two
Not Redeveloped
tL RMVL
8.58
2.57
6.98
3.16
33.85
23,43
23.43
20.29
19.75
(4)
(5)
(6)
(9,10)
(11)
(1)
(2)
(7)
(8)
12
12
12
54
.57
.17
.46
.87
52.79
36.34
36.34
31.65
30.80
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THREE MILLION MINUS - RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT
COMPONENT
Phase One
Retail
Office
Residential
Hotel
Parking
RMVnew Rold
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(6)
(4)
(5)
2.05
8.37
15.38
1.17
16.01
( 14.52)
( 8.38)
(5) 14.53
(5)
(6)
1.60)
.65)(
.73
.25
.46
.73
.46
.73
.25
.25
.25
,46
Gross Sq. Ft.
87,000
31,000
42,000
211,000
156,500
195,000
130,000
320,000
112,500 (
265,500 (
RMV
241,000
267,000
666,000
399,000
2,578,000
2,689,000)
1,057,000)
4,732,000
151,000)
51,000)
Phase Two
Retail
Office
(9,10)
(9,10)
Residential(9,10)
Parking (9,10) (
6.02
5.80
( 5.85)
.76)
.85
.85
.85
.85
39,000
183,000
268,000
1,217,000
570,000 ( 2,850,000)
182,000 18,000
TOTAL RMV FROM PARCELS REDEVELOPED $ 3,588,000
Parcels Not Redeveloped
(11) - 52.79 44,225 2,335,000
(1) - 36.54 109,328 3,995,000
(2) - 36.54 109,328 3,995,000
(7) - 31.64 63,950 2,024,000
(8) - 30.80 95,926 2,995,000
TOTAL RMV FROM PARCELS NOT REDEVELOPED
TOTAL RMV
$ 15,334,000
$ 18,932,000
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THREE MILLION MINUS. - PHASE ONE
PARCEL
R' (. 5) [F (RR)+F (CR)+F (IP) ]
-E' (.5) [F (RR)+F (CE)+F (IP)]
-E (.5) F (DE)
-E" (.5)F(RE)
- (A-L) [F (CX) -. 5F (IC) -. 5F (DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)]
0
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (.5) [F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U (A) (.5)F (DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
(4,5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(4)
(5)
(6)
RETAIL
49.30
12.86
.40
.54
25.36
16.74
8.61
3.01
5.46
1.53
7.13
13.30
.52
1.25
2.09
2.05
8.37
15.38
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54.18
14.47
.40
.54
29.50
19.48
8.61
26.26
6.16
.86
.26
22.85
22.85
8.42
2.95
5.46
.66 (12.29)
( 6.82)
13.83
.51
2.18
1.17
16.01
( 2.22)
( 1.57)
(14.51)
( 8.38)
HOTEL
114.81
53.84
1.87
1.50
42.04
42.04
3.08
PARKING
15.66
3.30
.40
.21
10.23
7.02
3.01
5.46
( 1.50)
( .67)
( .10)
.02
1.60)
( .65)
12.48
2.05
14.53
THREE MILLION MINUS. - PHASE TWO
PARCEL
R' (. 5) [F (RR)+F (CR)+F (IP) )
-E' (. 5) (F (RR)+F (CE)+F (IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E" (.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)] (9,10)
RETAIL
50.04
13.08
.53
.55
25.77
2.32
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
56.54
15.10
.53
.81
30.31
2.35
29.47
6.90
1.05
.45
26.31
2.37
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (.5) (F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F (DP)
(9,10) 6.02 5.80
HOTEL PARKING
16.36
co
H
3.42
.53
.27
10.89
2.37
(9,10)
(9,10)
7.80
1.34
7.44
1.36
( 7.62)
( 1.27)
( 1.12)
( .03)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE ( 5.85) (.76)
THREE MILLION MINUS - RMVold
PARCEL
Phase One
Phase Two
Not Redeveloped
L tL
12
12
12
54
(4)
(5)
(6)
(9,10)
(11)
(1)
(2)
(7)
(8)
11.03
3.86
6.98
3.11
33.85
23.43
23,43
20.29
19.75
RMV
.73
.25
.46
.85
52.79
36.34
36.34
31.65
30.80
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TWO MILLION - RMV BY DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT
COMPONENT
Phase One
Retail
Office
Residential
RMVnew RMVold
(4)
(5)
5.25
6.55
(4) 4.35
(5) ( 9.96)
.49
.39
.49
.39
Gross Sq. Ft.
28,000
19,000
351,500
RMV
161,000
132,000
1,700,000
407,500 ( 3,899,000)
TOTAL RMV FROM REDEVELOPED PARCELS $ ( 2,170,000)
Parcels Not Redeveloped
(11)
(1)
(2)
(7)
(8)
(9,10)
(6)
52.79
36.54
36.54
31.64
30.80
24.30
10.79
44,225
109,328
109,328
63,950
95,926
271,619
494,724
2,335,000
3,995,000
3,995,000
2,024,000
2,995,000
6,600,000
5,339,000
TOTAL RMV FROM PARCELS NOT REDEVELOPED
TOTAL RMV
$ 27,283,000
$ 25,113,000
-183-
TWO MILLION
PARCEL
R' (.5)[F(RR)+F(CR)+F(IP))
-E' (.5) [F(RR)+F(CE)+F(IP)]
-E* (.5)F(DE)
-E" (.5)F(RE)
-(A-L)[F(CX)-.5F(IC)-.5F(DP)]
-L[F(LA)-F(FD)-.5F(DP)] (4)
(5)
RETAIL
49.30
12.86
.40
.54
25.36
5.78
4.62
OFFICE RESIDENTIAL
54.18
14.47
.40
.54
29.50
5.78
26.26
6.16
.86
.26
22.85
4.52
NET MARKET VALUE
*
T (R') (.5) [F (RR)+F (CR) -F (IP)]
*
-U(A) (.5)F(DP)
RESIDUAL MARKET VALUE
HOTEL PARKING
1
(4)
(5)
(4)
(5)
(4)
(5)
4.36
5.52
.88
1.03
5.25
6.55
3.49
( 8.39)
.86
( 1.57)
4.35
( 9.96)
TWO MILLION 
- RMVld
PARCEL tL
(4) 7.40 12 .49
(5) 5.92 12 .39
Not Redeveloped (11) 33.85 - 52.79
(1) 23.43 - 36.34
(2) 23.43 - 36.34
(7) 20.29 - 31.65
(8) 19.75 - 30.80
(9,10) 15.58 - 24.30
(6) 6,92 - 10.79
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